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Abstract 
Various stage models have been proposed as a means of organizing 
and understanding the construct of moral reasoning. Kohlberg1 s 
(1976) simple stage model is the most rigid application of 
structuralism as he suggests that moral reasoning is based almost 
exclusively on the structural capacities of the reasoner. 
Significant criticism has been levied against this model as it has 
not fared well under scientific scrutiny. Rest (1979) has extended 
Kohlberg1 s paradigm in his design of a complex stage model. Rest 
(1979) suggests that situational factors play a major role in 
reasoning about moral problems. This results in complex stage 
patterns as individuals use a variety of different stage responses to 
address moral situations. Rest's measure of moral maturity, though, 
does not systematically evaluate situational influence. In addition 
it does not fully address complex stage patterns because only the 
highest moral stage usage (stages 5 and 6) is evaluated in 
determining an individual's level of moral maturity. Carroll (1981) 
has refined the assessment of moral reasoning in complex stage terms 
by addressing lower stage usage. His Rejection Scale effectively 
distinguishes reasoners in terms of moral maturity by measuring the 
degree to which reasoners reject the lower stage answers (presented 
in multiple choice format) when asked to judge whether the answer is 
a good reason for making a moral decision. 
The purpose of the present research was to further refine the 
complex stage model by systematically examining situational influence 
in terms of Carroll's notion of rejection. This resulted in an 
evaluation of the relative influence of story consequences, story 
themes and age effects on moral reasoning. 
Moral reasoning was measured by adapting Carroll's assessment 
device to include the systematic presentation of mild, moderate and 
severe consequence conditions. The psychometric properties of this 
new Rejection Scale were established in a pilot study. The pilot 
data indicates that this new measure is reliable across test 
administrations: it correlates well with other measures of moral 
reasoning, and the junior high and high school populations interact 
appropriately with the test materials (e.g., comprehension of test 
items, understanding and following directions). 
A total sample of 90 male and female students from 7th, 9th, and 
11th grade were randomly selected to participate in the main study. 
An explanation of the study was provided and consent was secured from 
students, parents, and teachers. All students completed the 
Rejection Scale (see appendix B). The data were analyzed, using a 
three by three by six ANOVA with repeated measures, by grade, 
consequence condition, and story theme. In addition, Scalogram 
Analysis was used to determine the scalability of the data by 
consequence condition, story theme, and age. 
The Scalogram Analysis demonstrated a very clear consequence 
effect as dilenmas were scalable by consequence condition with 
coefficients of reproducibility ranging from .85 to 1.0. This effect 
occurred for each age category. 
The Analysis of Variance provided additional support for this 
consequence effect. Each age category showed a strong consequence 
effect and the mild, moderate and severe consequence conditions all 
differed significantly from each other in each dilemma. 
An age effect was also demonstrated with Scalogram Analysis. The 
7th graders had the lowest average stage rating, followed by the 9th 
graders, and the 11th graders achieved the highest average stage 
ratings. 
This age effect was supported by the Analysis of Variance. There 
was a significant difference between all three ages at mild and 
moderate consequences, while 7th and 11th graders differed 
significantly at the severe consequence condition. 
Finally, the dilemma effect was demonstrated with Scalogram 
Analysis and Analysis of Variance. The dilerrmas differed in their 
average stage rating, and these differences held up across all three 
age groups and consequence conditions. In addition, the dilemmas 
differed in their degree of scalability. The Analysis of Variance 
showed significant differences between most of the dilemmas at mild 
and moderate consequences. 
The results from this study demonstrate that story consequences 
and story themes are significant functional aspects of moral 
situations. In addition, the structural aspect of Kohlberg's stage 
model was also demonstrated as a developmental progression was 
documented between 7th, 9th, and 11th graders. These results are 
discussed in terms of a model of moral reasoning which incorporates 
both functional and structural aspects. 
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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Various models have been proposed as a means of organizing and 
understanding moral development. The most noteworthy models are 
Kohlberg's simple stage model and Rest's complex stage approach. 
Kohlberg's simple stage model has not fared well under scientific 
scrutiny as researchers have failed to find support for his notion of 
structured whole, invariant sequence, and cultural universality. 
Rest has extended Kohlberg's six stage theory of moral development to 
account for situational influences on moral reasoning. His complex 
stage model is designed to measure moral reasoning by examining the 
variety of different stage responses which an individual uses to 
address each dilerrma. The model is also designed to accorrmodate 
variation in stage responses across dilemmas. This is an advance 
over Kohlberg's simple stage model which assumes that individuals use 
one stage of reasoning, primarily, to address various moral 
situations. Rest's measure of moral maturity, though, does not 
systematically evaluate situational influence and it does not fully 
address stage pattern complexity because only the highest moral stage 
usage (stages 5 and 6) is evaluated in determining an individual's 
level of moral maturity. 
Carroll has developed a more refined means of complex stage model 
measurement by looking at the degree to which individuals use lower 
stage reasoning. This has been shown to be more effective in 
distinguishing high and low level reasoners than measures which deal 
2 
strictly with preference for higher level thought. Carroll's device, 
however, also deals with situational variables unsystematically. 
One remaining task, then, is to systematically examine 
situational factors in terms of the complex stage model, using 
Carroll's notion of moral maturity. 
This situational investigation places this study within the 
bounds of Liebert's (1978) functional approach to moral reasoning. 
According to the functional approach individuals are not predisposed 
to think in certain ways due to their structural capacity. Rather, 
individuals are tuned into the payoff matrix of various situations 
and will respond to moral dilerranas in a way that will bring about the 
greatest payoff (Liebert, 1978). This functional approach to moral 
development for example, suggests that story theme and story 
consequences may be relevant functional aspects of moral situations. 
Studies conducted with children show that story consequence is a 
relevant situational factor (Armsby, 1971; Costanzo, 1973; Gutkin, 
1972; Hewitt, 1975). Other studies show that story themes may have 
situational influence (Nucci, 1981). 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of story 
consequences and story themes with individuals at various stages of 
moral maturity. This is a further refinement of the complex stage 
model. The goal was to create a hierarchical scale of development by 
showing an increase in use of Kohlberg's preconventional (Level I) 
reasoning under conditions of increasing severity of story 
consequence and across different story themes. 
While Rest proposes a complex stage model and suggests that 
individuals use a variety of different kinds of reasoning in 
different moral situations, he does not systematically describe how 
3 
individuals are influenced by these different situational factors and 
his present model is only capable of gross stage descriptions. The 
model developed in this study outlines the specific effects of story 
consequences and story themes on the moral reasoning of individuals 
at various points along the continuum of moral maturity. Further-
more, it increases our descriptive capacities of the contruct as one 
level of reasoning (i.e., the preconventional level) becomes 
subdivided in terms of a 7 step hierarchical sequence. This provides 
additional support for the continuous, as opposed to the discrete, 
model of development with respect to Kohlberg's six stage sequence. 
Finally, the results from this study represent one step in a 
potentially long line of research to build a structural-functional 
model which addresses a multitude of situational factors at each 
structural level. 
CHAPTER II 
STRUCTURAL STAGE THEORY 
The structural-developmental approach, according to Kohlberg and 
other developmental researchers, is based on the key assumption that 
development is a process of restructuring or reorganizing internal 
thought patterns. Developmental change, then represents internal 
reorganization rather than a mere accumulation of new information. 
These internal structures account for the various stages in the 
development of moral reasoning (Damon, 1980). These stages are 
internally consistent and qualitatively different from each other, 
and development is invariantly sequenced and hierarchical as each 
successive stage in the sequence logically subsumes all lower stages 
(Rest, 1973). In addition, Gibbs (1977) suggests that successive 
stages of development are more adaptive with respect to human 
functioning, thus we should expect similar developmental patterns 
across cultures • 
Structured Whole 
4 
Classifying development in terms of stages or levels is a means 
of organizing behavior according to discrete categories where each 
stage is internally consistent in terms of its unique logic. The 
logic within stages is internally consistent and qualitatively 
different from all other stages. This means that one's approach or 
response to various situations should reflect an orientation which is 
unified under a set of principles or rules for that stage. This 
response generalization, or unification of responses across diverse 
situations is referred to by Piaget as "structure d'ensemble 11 
(Flavell, 1963). Liebert (1978) suggests that, 
The concept of stages or levels of moral development 
implies that at any particular time in an individual's 
life one can find an organized system of feelings and 
beliefs that direct the individual's moral thought and 
action so as to produce similar responses to diverse 
situations (p. 8). 
Invariant Sequence 
Developmental progress, the move from one stage to the next, is 
marked by a consecutive, gradual, upward movement through the stage 
sequence. Each major reorganization in the course of development 
represents a new stage. The sequence, or particular order of stage 
acquisition, is invariant as development procedes one stage at a time, 
no stages are skipped, and there is resistance to extinction or 
regression (Gibbs, 1977). 
Hierarchical Development 
5 
Each succeeding stage in the sequence represents an advance over 
previous stages as all the elements of the old stage are transfonned 
and reorganized with new elements to form a more differentiated and 
integrated structure. The higher stage is more complex and adaptive as 
individuals are capable of using all lower stages as well as their 
present stage (Rest, 1973). The adaptive nature of development 
suggests that similar developmental patterns should be prevalent among 
members of the human species regardless of culture or other 
environmental factors (Gibbs, 1977). The rate of development may be a 
function of culture or other environmental influences but the basic 
pattern of development should be consistent within the species. 
Theoretical Conclusions 
According to the structural stage theory just reviewed, we should 
expect to discover similar developmental patterns among all members of 
the species, while specific developmental progress remains a function 
of cultural or other environmental factors. This developmental pattern 
is organized in terms of an invariant sequence of stages, where each 
stage is organized according to its own logic. Thus, individuals 
occupying the same stage should exhibit similar types of reasoning and 
their reasoning should be consistent across a variety of situations. 
Each successive stage in this sequence logically presupposes all 
previous stages and represents a more advanced fonn of development. 
6 
Kohlberg has attempted to describe his model of moral development 
in terms of the structural approach reviewed above. The following 
discussion is a brief review of the major aspects of his structural 
theory. 
CHAPTER I II 
KOHLBERG1 S STRUCTURAL THEORY: THE SIMPLE STAGE MODEL 
Kohlberg 1s model covers the range of moral development from 
childhood through adulthood. His first level of development (stages 
one and two) is very similar to Piaget•s description of early develop-
ment, which includes children from ages 4 or 5 up to about 8 or 9. 
Kohlberg 1s later stages describe development beyond Piaget•s highest 
stage, which extends only through early adolescence. Kohlberg believes 
that Piaget•s stages are inadequately formulated, thus he has subdivided 
and reorganized them to be better representations of true stages, and 
he has extended them to include more advanced development through 
adulthood (Damon, 1980). Thus, Kohlberg claims that his theory not 
only subsumes Piaget's stages of moral reasoning, but represents a 
reformulated and extended version to comply more rigidly with the 
structural developmental approach and cover life span development. 
Six Stages Of Reasoning 
Kohlberg initially formulated his six stage model based on a study 
of boys ages 10, 13, and 16 (Kohlberg, 1958). He included adults in 
later studies and conducted a series of longitudinal studies on his 
original group which has led to many theoretical revisions. The six 
stages are organized in tenns of three levels: preconventional, 
conventional, and post conventional. The level of interest in this 
study is Level I, the preconventional level. 
7 
Individuals at the preconventional level of development do not 
understand or respond to the rules or expectations of society. Rather, 
preconventional reasoners interpret rules on a literal level in defer-
ence to an authority figure such as a parent. Right and wrong is 
strictly determined by whether one has obeyed or disobeyed these rules 
regardless of intent or the motives involved. Reasons for behavior at . 
this level include self-interest, avoiding punishment, and deference to 
authority (Kohlberg, Colby, Gibbs, & Speicher-Dubin, 1976). 
The preconventional level is subdivided into stages one and two. 
Stage one reasoners obey rules for the primary purpose of avoiding 
aversive consequences, and stage two reasoners operate for personal 
gain (Kohlberg, et al, 1976). Kohlberg (1976) claims that most 
children under age 9 are at the preconventional level, as are some 
adolescents and adult criminal offenders. 
Most adolescents and adults, however, reason according to 
conventional morality (Kohlberg, et al, 1976). Conventional level 
reasoners (stages three and four) define right in terms of the rules, 
roles and expectations of society or smaller groups such as religious 
and political organizations. The main distinction between stages at 
the conventional level is that stage three reasoners apply their 
conventional thinking to interpersonal situations and stage four 
individuals respond to the entire social order (Damon, 1980). Stage 
three reasoners, for example, conform to standards designed by others 
in pursuit of approval from these authority figures. Stage four 
reasoners, however, may confonn to social nonns in order to gain 
acceptance as good citizens. Damon (1980) adds, "Justice as stage 
four, thus, becomes establishing good citizenship, working hard, and 
maintaining the law of the land" (p. 42). 
8 
Post conventional reasoning (stages five and six) is the highest 
level in Kohlberg's paradigm. These individuals define right in terms 
of universal human rights, values and principles. They believe that it 
is usually right to uphold the law, however, violations of the law are 
justified when the law is not protecting human rights. In cases where 
principles come into conflict with society's rules the post convention-
al individual judges by principles rather than convention. 
Stage five reasoners, for example, conceive of morality in terms of 
a social contract, "he or she conceives of moral responsibility as 
binding upon all those who cl aim the rights of soci ety 11 (Damon, 1980, 
p. 42). Individuals feel obligated to obey the law because they have 
created a social contract to make and abide by laws for the good of all, 
to protect their own rights and the rights of others. According to 
Kohlberg, et~' (1976) a social contract is equivalent to 11 ••• the 
notion that by living in society you have made a generalized commitment 
to respect and uphold the rights of others (and the laws this entails)" 
(p. 13). 
Stage six reasoners are guided by self chosen ethical principles 
which are universal for all humanity. 
Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid 
because they are based on such principles. When laws 
violate these principles one acts in accordance with 
the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: The equality of human rights and respect for 
the dignity of human beings as individual persons (Kohlberg, et al, 1976, p. 20). 
9 
Kohlberg believes that his six stage model of moral development 
fits well within the structural developmental approach outlined earlier 
(Damon, 1980). His theoretical notions of development can best be 
understood in terms of the simple stage model (Rest, 1979). 
The Simple Stage Model 
Figure 1 (see page 10) is a graphic presentation of the simple 
stage model representing the major theoretical aspects of development 
according to Kohlberg (Rest, 1979). 
Kohlberg suggests that individuals pass through alternate periods 
of transition and consolidation in the course of acquiring new modes of 
reasoning. Reasoners develop from a point of using one stage 
exclusively to using reasoning one stage above their dominant stage 
(+1) at increasing levels of frequency. The use of the +1 stage 
continues to increase until the former stage is dropped completely and 
again one stage of reasoning is used exclusively. 11Higher stages 
displace the structures found at lower stages 11 (Kohlberg, 1967, p. 32). 
Thus, at times individuals utilize one stage exclusively after 
completely discarding the previous stage, and the +1 stage is still out 
of reach. This is a period of maximum consolidation and no further 
development of that stage occurs (Rest, 1979). Each stage peaks at 
100% usage and has a turn at predominance in use over the other stages. 
In addition, the consolidation of successive stages is sequential 
and hierarchical. Rest (1973) demonstrated that Kohlberg's six stages 
form an invariant sequence as subject's comprehension of stage 
prototype statements formed a Guttman scale. 
The stages form a Guttman scale of comprehension as 
the attainment of a more advanced stage presupposes 
attainment of the simpler, less advanced stages. A 
new stage does not simply replace a previous stage, 
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nor is it added to it, but rather the new stage is a 
transformation of elements of the old along with new 
elements into a new emergent structure ... Each 
succeeding stage is said to be an advance over the 
preceding stage in being a more differentiated and 
integrated structure (Rest, 1973, p. 86). 
Furthermore, Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) report that once a new more 
advanced stage has emerged, regression to a previous stage is rare. 
In addition, Kohlberg et al, (1976) suggest, 
Stage theory holds that every single individual, 
studied longitudinally, should move only one step at a 
time through the stage sequence and always in the same 
order (p. 39). Stages imply distinct or qualitative 
differences in structure and the different structures 
form an invariant sequence (p. 32). 
11 
Developmental change, in Kohlberg's view, involves structural 
reorganization. "Development involves change in the general shape, 
pattern, or organization of responses rather than change in the 
frequency or intensity of emission of an already patterned response" 
(Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969, p. 98). Rest adds, 
The quality is critical in the simple stage model. 
The issue in question is what stage is being used, not 
how much. The quantitative aspect is irrelevant as it 
is assumed the individual will use this mode of 
thought all the time (p. 50). 
Kohlberg (1976) concludes "individuals should be consistently at a 
stage unless they are in transition to the next stage" (p. 74). He 
believes that the stage forms a clustered whole as there is a general 
factor of moral stage cross-cutting all moral situations. 
Each of these different and sequential modes of thought 
forms a structured whole - a given stage response on a 
task does not just represent a specific response, 
rather it represents an underlying thought or gani zati on 
(Kohl berg, et al. 1976, p. 32). 
Thus Kohlberg assumes that individuals will evidence the same stage 
of reasoning in response to different moral situations. In Kohlberg's 
simple stage view, the characteristics of structural theory do not 
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allow for stage mixture unless the individual is in transition to the 
next highest stage. 
Theoretical Conclusions 
According to Kohlberg, stages of moral development are organized 
according to a logic which is internally consistent and qualitatively 
different from the logic of every other stage. Individuals use just 
one stage of moral reasoning across most situations unless they are 
in transition, which involves the use of +l reasoning. Developmental 
progress consists of sequential consolidation of successive stages. 
This sequence is hierarchical and invariant, thus lower levels of 
moral reasoning are no longer used once higher levels have been 
attained. Kohlberg has also offered evidence of naturalism by citing 
examples of all his stages in other cultures. Furthermore, he claims 
that the same invariant sequence has been documented cross-culturally 
(Kohlberg, 1969). 
CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL CRITIQUE 
Kohlberg•s paradigm is a rigid application of structural 
developmental theory. Many researchers have reviewed the structural 
aspects of Kohlberg•s model (Edwards, 1978; Gibbs, 1977; Holstein, 
1976; Kohlberg, 1968; Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Kuhn 
1976; Kurtines & Grief, 1974; McGeorge, 1974; Siegal, 1980). This 
has included an examination of naturalism, structured whole, and 
Kohlberg1 s invariant six stage sequence of development. 
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Structured Whole 
Kohlberg claims that all of his stages are qualitatively 
different modes of thought and individuals are expected to respond in 
a way which is characteristic of their stage, not in some manner more 
primitive or more mature. However, Kohlberg reports that stage 
responses across all nine dilemmas correlate .31 to .75, with a mean 
correlation of .51. 
McGeorge (1974) noted significant variation between dilemmas in 
the responses of forty 12-year-old boys and 23 university students 
(range of correlation= .00 to .33). McGeorge suggests that the 
dilemmas are not pure measures of a single aspect of morality as 
Kohlberg believes. 
The present author also documented significant stage mixture 
(Plummer, 1982). Seventy college sophomores each used a full range 
of reasoning (stages 2-5) to address different moral situations, 
rather than the dominant and +1 reasoning suggested by the simple 
stage model. Reasoning within each moral situation was also 
characterized by a full range of stage responses. Evidently subjects 
drew from a variety of different levels of thought in an attempt to 
address each dilemma most adequately. Assigning a single stage 
rating or expecting subjects to justify their answers with reasoning 
on just one stage, then, is unrealistic (Plummer, 1982). 
Invariant Sequence 
The strongest support for an invariant stage sequence is usually 
based on longitudinal research. Three major longitudinal studies 
have attempted to validate Kohlberg1 s sequence of development. 
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Kohlberg and Kramer (1969), in their only published longitudinal 
follow up, found that the subjects from Kohlberg's 1958 sample of 
seventy-two 10, 13 and 16 year old boys showed little systematic 
change in moral reasoning over time, and 20% regressed from stages 
four and five to stage two. Kohlberg explained this regression by 
developing, post hoc, a new stage which he labeled 4B. This stage 
was designed to address the identity crisis .which high school 
graduates encounter as they enter college. That is, high school 
graduates shift from a societal rule orientation to an idealistic 
view of the world. They assume that everyone's ideas are equally 
valid, thus their judgnents should be considered equal to others. As 
a result, this stage of development seemed to resemble the stage 2 
self interest orientation. 
Holstein (1976) conducted a three year longitudinal study, 
collecting data from 53 families, inc l uding both parents, as well as 
their sons and daughters who were 13-years-old at the first assessment 
and age 16 at the second assessment. Holstein found no evidence of 
the stepwise progression described by Kohlberg's theory, and many of 
her subjects regressed from higher to lower stages across the three 
year period. Also, adults were just as likely to regress as 
adolescents. Even when Holstein used the new controversial stage 4B 
there was still 25% regression from stages four, five and six to 
stages one, two, and three. 
Kuhn (1976) conducted a one year longitudinal study of fifty 5-8 
year olds with assessment at six month intervals. The first 
assessment indicated that equal numbers of subjects regressed and 
progressed slightly. The second assessment reported similar 
results. Overall results from the one year period showed that a 
total of 32 subjects progressed slightly and five subjects 
regressed. Although only five subjects showed regression overall, 
almost every subject showed both progression and regression at some 
point during the study, with amount progressed slightly more than 
amount regressed. 
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Kuhn (1976) and Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) claim that measurement 
error can account for the minor regressions noted in both of their 
studies rather than admit that the theory is flawed. I suggest that 
if measurement error can account for slight regressions then it must 
also be credited with the slight progression (e.g., none of Kuhn1 s 
subjects progressed an entire stage). 
Measurement error in Kuhn1 s study could have been a major problem 
due to her inappropriate use of global scoring. Global scoring is a 
gross estimate of the individual 1 s stage of reasoning, insensitive to 
small changes in stage usage, thus it is most inappropriate for a one 
year longitudinal study. It is possible that considerably more 
progression and regression occurred in Kuhn's study but it was not 
documented due to the insensitivity of global scoring. At best, this 
study provides no evidence for Kohlberg1 s sequence of moral develop-
ment. 
Kohlberg1 s six stage invariant sequence lacks empirical support. 
Regression was found in all the longitudinal research and no 
empirical evidence has been provided for stages five and six. Many 
researchers can document Kohlberg1 s early stages but cannot find 
support for a six stage sequence. 
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Regression not only represents a violation of Kohlberg's 
invariant sequence, it also violates his sense of structured whole 
because the same subjects are using reasoning from a wide variety of 
lower st ages. 
Natura 1 ism 
Kohlberg (1968) cites cross-cultural evidence for his six stages 
of moral reasoning as well as his sequence of development. He claims 
to have discovered universal moral principles as his theory of 
development pertains to the human species in general. Kohl berg bases 
these claims largely on some unpublished work. He collected data in 
the United States, Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey, and Yucatan which showed 
that 7% of the 16-year-olds in America and Mexico used stage six 
reasoning and 1% or 1 ess of a comparable Taiwan sample reasoned at 
this stage. None of the children in either Turkey or Yucatan were 
able to reach even stage five. Thus, stage five is missing in two of 
the five samples and stage six is absent in three of the samples. 
According to Kurtines and Grief (1974) "age trends in stage five and 
six are clearly present only in the United States sample -- the same 
group Kohl berg ( 1958) used to derive the stages" (p. 461). They 
conclude 
that there is no evidence to support Kohlberg's claim that the course 
of moral development is universal. 
Siegal (1980) also reviewed cross-cultural research relevant to 
Kohlberg's paradigm. He concluded that stage five and six reasoning 
is generally attained only in western societies, and much of that 
post conventional reasoning can be attributed to scoring error. 
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The lack of evidence to support the development of post 
conventional reasoning in members of the same species across cultures 
renders Kohlberg•s claim of universality somewhat questionable. At 
best, no evidence has been shown to document naturalism with respect 
to Kohlberg•s theory of development. In addition, Siegal (1980) 
concludes that without a sufficiently large sample of persons who 
reason at stages five and six there can be no empirical support upon 
which to base an invariant six stage sequence. 
CHAPTER V 
REST'S STRUCTURAL THEORY: THE COMPLEX STAGE MODEL 
Many researchers have failed to find support for Kohlberg•s 
version of structural developmental theory. Specific theoretical 
problems include lack of evidence for his notion of invariant 
sequence, structured whole, and naturalism. The evidence indicates 
that a rigid application of structural theory, such as the simple 
stage model, is inappropriate. Rest (1979) believes that 11no pure 
direct assessment of cognitive structure exists that is unaffected by 
the specific task, content and response characteristics of the 
situation" (p. 64). Thus, Rest's complex stage model is an attempt 
to adapt Kohlberg•s structural theory to consider the situational 
aspects along with the structural capacities of the reasoner. 
Com pl ex Stage Mode 1
The com pl ex stage model (see figure 2) i 11 ustrates the extension 
of structural theory to account for the different types of reasoning 
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across situations. Rest (1979) suggests that development can be 
assessed in terms of probability. Subjects begin by using a type of 
reasoning only in certain instances and move towards solidifying that 
reasoning and applying it to a wider variety of situations. The 
probability of observing a particular type of reasoning in an 
individual is a function of the degree of solidification. Thus the 
notion that a subject is in a particular stage is wrong. Rather than 
wondering whether a subject is in a stage or not, we should be more 
concerned with the type of situations or conditions which are likely to 
induce individuals to organize their thinking in certain ways. 
Since it is difficult to consider a subject at a particular stage, 
the complex stage model refers to development as the increasing 
probability of using higher stages of reasoning (Rest, 1979). As 
illustrated in figure 2, it is possible to advance in several 
organizations of thinking simultaneously (e.g., moving to advanced 
levels of stage three, moderate levels of stage four, the earliest 
levels of stage five, and decreasing use of stage two). One 
implication of the complex stage model, then, is that when subjects 
becane capable of higher level thought the lower reasoning is not 
totally abandoned (as proposed by the simple stage model). Subjects 
may prefer to use the higher stages as they becane possible but still 
use lower stage reasoning in certain situations (Rest, 1979). 
Development, as described by the complex stage model, is sequential 
as well as hierarchical. Also, the use of post conventional reasoning 
can be more widely found as it is not necessary to use this level 
exclusively before being credited with it, as Kohlberg's model assumes. 
Thus, all the general elements of structural developmental stage theory 
which were violated in Kohlberg1 s structuralism are maintained by 
accounting for development in terms of the complex stage model. 
Theoretical Critique 
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The complex stage model describes development as a continuous 
rather than discrete, step-like process. Development is characterized 
by increasing probability of higher stage usage and simultaneous 
decreasing probability of lower stage usage. This is because 
individuals who are capable of using post-conventional reasoning in 
sane instances may use a variety of lower level responses in other 
situations as individuals respond to situational demands. 
This model seems intuitively appealing as it links structural 
theory with a functional approach. Rest has not only designed a model 
which integrates these two approaches, he has also designed a method of 
assessment which yields a profile of stage usage across a variety of 
moral situations. However, this complex stage approach falls short of 
a thorough understanding of moral development. The significance of 
situational factors, for example, is the foundation of the complex 
approach, yet Rest has done little to explicate this facet. Rest does 
little more than suggest that situational factors must be relevant and 
individual stage patterns of moral reasoning are more complex than the 
simple stage model proposes. This leaves many questions unanswered: 
1) What are the relevant situational factors? 
2) What is the precise effect of situational factors? 
3) Do these factors have a consistent influence on all reasoners 
at every step in the development sequence? 
Given that situational factors play a major role in moral 
reasoning, we need to understand specifically what these factors are 
and the way they operate throughout the full range of moral 
development. We cannot assume, for example, that Rest's (1979) six 
21 
story moral preference test or Kohlberg•s (1979) three story moral 
interview technique are systematically sampling the full range of 
relevant situational factors. In fact, the situational factor is 
dealt with quite haphazardly in these moral assessment devices as the 
total array of potentially influential factors varies 
unsystematically. We need to understand situational influence more 
fully by dealing with it more systematically in moral assessment. 
Another difficulty with the complex stage model is the index of 
measurement (P"/4). P% reflects the percentage of time an individual 
uses stages 5 or 6 while completing Rest's test of moral maturity. 
An increase in P% is considered developmental progression. This is 
based on the assumption that individuals decrease in lower stage 
thought as they increase in moral reasoning at stages 5 and 6. While 
P% is reported to be a reliable and valid index of moral maturity, it 
largely ignores development in tenns of lower stage patterns. While 
an individual 1 s P% may remain constant over time, development may 
indeed be occurring as lower stage patterns shift. We cannot be sure 
that P% will always reflect the shift in lower stage preference. In 
fact, the present author demonstrated that individuals with the same 
P% did not have similar lower stage patterns (Plummer, 1982). 
Even though P% is reported to be a psychometrically sound index of 
moral maturity, it is deficient as a true measure of the construct, 
to the extent that it largely ignores the four lower stages in a six 
stage model without adequate justification. We need a more 
comprehensive way to look at the full spectrum of development. 
Carroll and Rest (1981) have designed a method of moral assessment 
which considers development in tenns of lower stage usage. Both Rest 
(1973) and Carroll and Rest (1981) report that the highest stages of 
reasoning tend to be preferred by all reasoners regardless of their 
developmental level. Thus preference for higher stage responses 
makes no distinction between high and low level reasoners. 
In each preference study, virtually all subjects pre-
ferred the highest stage statements. Hence preference 
of statements did not differentiate subjects. Differ-
ences were noted in the rating of lower stage items by 
age groups (Carroll & Rest, 1981, p. 538). 
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Thus, Carroll and Rest began looking at moral development in 
terms of rejection or "growing out" of the lower stage thought. This 
notion is based theoretically on the principle of hierarchy. The 
development of higher stage thought requires the incorporation of 
earlier, simpler stage reasoning. As individuals develop a more 
encompassing approach the lower stages are seen as simplistic or less 
adequate (Carroll & Rest, 1981). 
Carroll and Rest (1981) discovered definite age trends in the 
rejection of lower stage reasoning. Older subjects (11th graders) 
rejected lower stage reasoning more frequently than younger subjects 
(7th graders). The groups did not differ on the rejection of higher 
stage thought. Carroll and Rest (1981) conclude, "when individuals 
give up thinking at stages lower than their model stage, this can be 
viewed as developmental advance in the sense of consolidation at the 
higher stage" (p. 43). Thus, an understanding of the development of 
moral reasoning can be made more comprehensive by considering rejec-
tion patterns of 1 ower stage thought. 
The "rejection score" approach addresses the concern outlined 
earlier, that is, to look more comprehensively at lower stage 
patterns. While rejection of lower stage reasoning may be a function 
of moral maturity, it may al so vary differentially as a function of 
situational factors. Thus, we need to deal more systematically with 
the situational factor within the framework of rejection of lower 
stage reasoning. 
CHAPTER. VI 
STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS 
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Various structural theories have been discussed, including 
Kohlberg's simple stage model and Rest's complex stage approach. 
Kohlberg's model is a rigid application of structuralism as he 
suggests that one's cognitive framework, in terms of a particular 
stage of reasoning, is the pervasive factor in the moral reasoning 
manifested in response to moral dilemmas. Rest has extended 
Kohlberg's model to conclude that one is not restricted to using just 
one stage of reasoning at a time. He believes that reasoners utilize 
a full range of stage responses to most adequately address each moral 
situation. He also suggests that situational factors, inherent in 
all moral dilemmas, play an important role in tenns of influencing 
moral reasoning. His assessment of moral reasoning, though, a) does 
not systematically address situational influence and b) his index of 
measurement does not fully address stage pattern complexity because 
it largely ignores lower stage usage without sufficient justification. 
Carroll has extended Rest's work to look more closely at lower stage 
patterns. Carroll's measure yields a more comprehensive view of the 
complex stage patterns as it looks at moral maturity in terms of 
rejection of lower stage thought. Given Carroll's refinement of the 
structural stage model, the task remains to systematically examine 
situational influence. The functional approach to moral reasoning 
which was outlined earlier has suggested some relevant situational 
factors. In addition, some studies have been conducted with young 
children which systematically examine story consequences as a 
functional factor. None of these studies has been conducted with 
adolescents or adults and none of them has incorporated Carroll's 
refinement of the structural model. 
Functional Aspects 
One feature of this functional approach is an emphasis on the 
importance of situational factors. 
It is assumed that situational contingencies inf l uence 
all responses within the moral sphere, and that they 
also exert a considerable effect on the moral judgments 
and justifications which children and adults will 
advance in response to hypothetical moral dilemmas 
(Liebert, 1978, p. 45). 
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Functionalists do not assume that individuals are predisposed to think 
in certain ways due to their structural capacity. Rather, individuals 
are tuned into the payoff matrix of various situations and will respond 
to moral dilemmas in a way that will bring about the greatest payoff. 
The most important question in this functional approach, then, is: 
Which elements of the situation are functional? (Liebert, 1978). 
Another important feature of this functional approach is the 
emphasis on the growth of knowledge and experience. The age-correlated 
changes, which are often referred to as development due to structural 
change, may be a reflection of changes in the infonnation, knowledge, 
and experience that naturally comes with age (Liebert, 1978). 
With increasing age and experience human beings acquire 
the ability to do many new things •.. In a very real 
way, for example, the average six-year-old child is 
barred from Kohlbergian stage 4 moral reasoning because 
of ignorance of the workings of the law (rather than 
limitations in structural capacity) (Liebert, 1978, p. 
48). 
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One of the most salient functional variables in moral situations 
is the objectively presented or subjectively perceived or anticipated 
consequences. Individuals have the ability to infer consequences 
from moral situations so as to construct sophisticated payoff 
matrices. 
A person's moral judgments, moral justifications, or 
personal conduct may be influenced by the cues the 
person is given before or while confronting a moral 
dilerruna and these cues may be interpreted by the person 
as having implications about the actual payoff matrix 
that prevails in this situation (Liebert, 1978, p. 58). 
Little has been done to systematically examine the functional aspects 
of moral situations using Kohlberg•s, Rest's, or Carroll's paradigm. 
However, some researchers have investigated situational factors with 
children using Piaget's paradign. 
The Functional Aspect of Story Consequences 
Considerable research has been conducted to examine the effects 
of story consequences on children's moral reasoning using Piaget's 
theoretical framework. The Piagetian assessment technique is to 
present children with story pairs and ask them which child (each story 
has one main child character) is naughtier. In one story the child 
causes severe damage while behaving according to good intentions. In 
the other story the child causes minimal damage while acting out of 
bad intentions. Children below seven to eight years judge according 
to damage level or consequences and older children consider 
intentions when making their moral judgments (Piaget, 1965). 
Armsby (1971) noticed that regardless of intentions, the damage· 
level in the two stories is not the same. In one instance consider-
able damage is caused and in the other story only minimal damage 
occurs. Since two variables, damage and intention, are being manipu-
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lated at once it is difficult to determine how and why children 
change their focus. Armsby (1971) held intentions constant, at a 
"good" level, and varied the severity of damage. Results indicate 
that fewer children make intentionality judgments as the severity of 
consequences increases in the stories of good intention. As 
consequences become more severe intentionality loses its potency as 
the relevant variable. When children judge according to intention on 
Piaget's measure it does not mean the child considers consequences 
irrelevant. It may mean that consequences are being · considered and 
put on low priority due to their level of severity. 
Hewitt (1975) examined the effects of provocation, intentions and 
consequences on children's moral judgments. Serious injury to the 
victim (severe consequences) evoked more negative evaluations of the 
harm doers than did minor injury (mild consequences) when intentions 
and provocation were held constant. Hewitt noticed that even when 
subjects were capable of making judgements according to intentions 
they still had consideration for consequences. 
Costanzo (1973) believes that a major problem with the Piagetian 
assessment device is that regardless of intentions the consequences 
are always negative. When Costanzo structured stories to include 
positive consequences it was discovered that the intentions of the 
story character were equally important for all age groups. Costanzo 
concluded that young children make their choices on the basis of 
consequences because it is the more salient and identifiable cue, not 
because intentions are irrelevant. 
Gutkin (1972) examined the effect of systematic story changes on 
intentionality. This involved the sytematic variation of two levels 
of intention (good and bad) and consequence (mild and severe). 
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Children who judged according to intention, using the standard 
Piaget i an assessment, judged in terms of consequences when intent i ans 
were held constant. Based on these findings Gutkin proposed a four 
step developmental sequence to supplement Piaget's two stage model. 
Step one individuals always judge according to consequences regardless 
of intention. Step two individuals believe that intentions are 
important but only if level of damage (consequences) is equal. Step 
three reasoners focus on intentions but will shift to a consequence 
focus if intentions are equal. Step four subjects believe that 
damage is never a relevant factor. 
Thus, it has been demonstrated that subjects can be influenced to 
shift their reasoning depending upon the severity of consequences and 
intentions. Most specifically, when one factor is held constant it 
is likely that the other variable plays a major role in the child's 
mar a 1 dee is i on . 
In addition, Nucci (1981) sorted moral dilemmas into categories 
of personal, social/conventional, and justice. It was discovered 
that these story themes had differential effects on moral reasoning 
in terms of perceived consequences. There was a signific.ant tendency 
for subjects at college and high school age to judge an action as 
most wrong because they perceived the adverse consequences of the act 
as affecting many others. Dilemmas that were judged least wrong by 
this population were regarding rules or the prohibition of an act by 
an authority. Also, when the transgression creates disorder it is 
judged less severely than acts which resulted in adversely affecting 
many people. 
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Theoretical Conclusions: The Structural-Functional Model 
The functional approach suggests that experience and situational 
factors, such as perceived consequences and story theme, are major 
factors influencing moral reasoning. The structural model has 
provided a framework for organizing different types of reasoning. 
This structural model is hierarchical and the sequence of development 
is invariant. The functional model has provided a number of 
situational factors which may impinge upon the reasoner in moral 
situations. The task remains to build a model which is capable of 
organizing the developnent of moral reasoning according to both 
structural and functional features. 
Moral reasoning then, may best be understood through a combined 
structural-functional approach. This is an approach which 
illustrates how functional factors, such as story consequences and 
story themes impinge on the moral reasoning of individuals who differ 
in their structural capacity. Cognitive structures may manifest 
themselves in the form of a particular stage of reasoning, to the 
extent that an individual is consolidated at that stage and 
situational influence is minimal. Little is understood about this 
structural-functional interaction as the functional factors have not 
been systematically examined in the structural models. 
Story consequences and story themes are two functional aspects 
examined in this study. These factors were examined in terms of 
their interaction with the structural-developmental period between 
7th and 11th grade. Consequences varied in their severity and were 
hypothesized to influence moral reasoning by inducing subjects to 
reason at lower levels. Resistance to consequence influence, 
however, was expected to vary as a function of structural developnent 
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(as depicted by the three grade levels). It was not clear exactly 
how story themes would influence reasoning, however, it was 
hypothesized that there would be differences in the reasoning used to 
address different moral stories which could not be accounted for by 
the severity of consequences. 
CHAPTER VII 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Question One 
The first question addressed by this project is whether story 
consequences interact with an individual's structural capacity (the 
reasoner's stage or level of moral maturity) to form a cumulative 
or Guttman scale. That is, as story consequences increase in severi-
ty, will individuals be less likely to reject consequence level 
reasoning (Kohlberg's Level I, preconventional) as an appropriate 
answer to moral dilenmas? This first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Story consequence (mild, moderate, and severe) is a functional 
aspect of the moral dilenma which interacts with the reasoner's 
structural capacity to yield differential effects on the moral 
reasoning of junior high and high school students. 
Question Two 
The second question addressed by this project is whether the 
cumulative or Guttman scale described in question one can effectively 
distinguish the three grade levels of subjects. Is there a develop-
mental trend with 7th, 9th, and 11th graders, marked by a lower 
rr• 
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position on the Guttman scale of younger subjects, while older 
subjects occupy a higher step on this scale? 
group show the same story consequence effect? 
is stated as follows: 
Also, will each age 
This second hypothesis 
The cumulative scale has criterion group validity as it represents 
a developnental continuum between younger and older students. 
Question Three 
The third question addressed by this project is whether story 
theme is a relevant functional aspect of moral reasoning. This third 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Story theme is a relevant functional aspect of moral reasoning as 
different story themes have differential effects on the moral reason-
ing of junior high and high school students. 
CHAPTER VIII 
METHOD 
Pilot Study 
The primary measure used in this study is the Rejection Scale 
(see Appendix Band Measures section). The Rejection Scale used in 
this study, however, has been altered from the standardized version 
(Carroll, 1974) in order to test a new set of hypotheses. Carroll's 
scale presents four moral dilemmas with no control of functional 
factors such as story consequences. Carroll's instrument has been 
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altered to present three different consequence conditions for each of 
six moral dilenmas. Thus, the pilot study was used to establish 
reliability (test-retest) and validity (construct and criterion 
group) of a new Rejection Scale. Thus, the information gleaned from 
this pilot study was used to establish the psychometric properties of 
the new Rejection Scale, and facilitate the refinement of the 
instrument if necessary. 
Subjects 
The subjects in this pilot study included a total sample of 90 
male and female junior high and high school students, 30 from each of 
the 7th, 9th, and 11th grades. Each group was comprised of 
approximately equal numbers of males and females. This sample was 
selected from a small rural school system in eastern Connecticut. 
The students were selected randanly from study halls which are part 
of every student's required program. The students participated 
through an arrangement made with parents, students, teachers, and 
school administration, after an explanation of the project was 
offered. Student confidentiality was maintained as no student names 
were used in the processing of results. 
This project was reviewed and approved by the superintendent, 
director of special education, and school principals. In addition, 
it was reviewed and approved by the Human Subjects Review Board at 
the University of Rhode Isl and. 
Measures 
Rejection Scale. The Rejection Scale is a measure of moral 
maturity based on the subject's rejection of lower stage reasoning. 
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Carroll and Rest (1981) demonstrated that rejection of lower stage 
reasoning increases with age and mora 1 maturity. Carro 11 and Rest 
(1981) conclude, 11when individuals give up thinking at stages lower 
than their modal stage, this can be viewed as developmental advance 
in the sense of consolidation at the higher stage 11 (p. 43). This 
notion of measuring moral maturity through rejection of reasoning led 
to the development of Carroll's objective instrument. Carroll's 
measure is based on Kohl berg's six stage model. His measure consists 
of four moral dilemmas each of which is followed by reasons for 
action, in the moral situation. Ten reasons, two at each of 
Kohl berg's stages 1-5, comprise the response choices. Subjects are 
expected to rate each reason in terms of one of four categories: 1) 
I accept the reason; 2) I tend to accept the reason; 3) I tend to 
reject the reason; or 4) I reject the reason. Scoring ranges from 1 
point for every 111 accept the reason 11 to 4 points for every 111 reject 
the reason. 11 In this manner a rejection rating is •established. 
Theoretically the higher stage subjects should have higher rejection 
ratings. 
Criterion group validity was established in Carroll's 1981 study 
as older subjects (11th graders) did indeed have higher rejection 
ratings than younger subjects (7th graders). Carroll (1974) also 
reports internal consistency for each stage (1 through 5), using Hoyt 
reliability coefficients, in the range of .48-.74. 
The Rejection Scale used in this present study was altered from 
Carroll 1 s version in order to test a new set of hypotheses (see 
appendix B for a copy of this new Rejection Scale). 
This new Rejection Scale is comprised of five moral dilemmas 
which are currently being used in three other major moral assessment 
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devices, plus a dilenma designed by the present author for specific 
use in this study. Each of the six dilemmas has three forms so as to 
depict three consequence conditions (mild, moderate, and severe). The 
consequence levels were established by primarily two separate proce-
dures. The first procedure included an analysis of the structured 
interview material from a previous study (Plummer, 1982). This analy-
sis was used to detennine how other subjects rated the consequences, 
presented unsystematically in the stories on the Defining Issues Test 
(Rest, 1979). Based on this infonnation, and significant contributions 
from the committee supervising this project, the consequence levels 
were intuitively designed. 
Following the intuitive derivation of mild, moderate, and severe 
consequences, the subjects in the pilot study were asked to rate all 
the consequences in the Rejection Scale, from 1 to 10 in terms of 
severity. The results depicted in Table 16 (page 88) show that all 
ages rated the mild consequence condition less severe than moderate, 
and the moderate was rated milder than the severe condition. This 
relationship was documented for each of the six stories. Thus, the 
intuitive design of consequence levels, based on structured interview 
data, was supported with empirical results by the same population that 
was used in the main study. 
The main feature of this new Rejection Scale is the representation 
of three consequence conditions along with six different story themes 
(a total of 18 dilenmas). The test is designed to counter balance the 
order of story theme so that each story theme appears in each of the 
six positions an equal number of times over the entire sample. 
A set of three response choices follows each story. These 
response choices are based on Kohlberg•s three level system so that 
each level is represented among the response choices. Levels are 
used to code responses, rather than stages, because the levels seem 
to be based on clearer structural and conceptual distinctions. 
-
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Subjects must rate each response choice in terms of the following 
categories: 11G11 , this is a good reason; 11U11 , I am uncertain about 
this reason; or 11P11 , this is a poor reason. Scoring ranges from 0 
for every 11Good11 response to 1 point for 11Uncertai n11 responses, and 2 
points for every 11Poor 11 response. Scores are totaled for the Level I 
answers to yield a rejection score for each story. 
Structured Interview. The structured interview was used to 
evaluate the Rejection Scale by addressing the following concerns. 
1. Did the subjects understand the stories and response choices? 
2. Why did subjects reject response choices? 
2a. Were they unable to understand them? 
2b. Did they understand response choices and place 
them on low priority? 
3. Explore rejection of Level I thought. 
3a. Why is Level I thought rejected in some instances 
and accepted in others? 
3b. Is there consistency between stories on the same 
consequence condition? (in terms of rejection 
scores) 
4. Do subjects consistently and correctly place consequences in 
the categories of mild, moderate, and severe? 
5. Do subjects choose the 11uncertain 11 response frequently 
enough to warrant this response category? 
6. Can subjects think of a better response choice which was not 
listed? 
The specific interview questions addressed the subject's particular 
pattern of responses to the Rejection Scale. These specific questions 
differed for each subject, since it was highly unlikely that subjects 
would generate identical response patterns. However, the purpose and 
format of the interview remained constant as it addressed the issues 
and concerns listed earlier. The following five steps represent a 
model approach to the structured interview. 
1. Subjects were given 5 minutes to review their protocol. 
This not only provided subjects with an opportunity to 
refresh their memory, it al so gave them a chance to 
re-evaluate their choices. 
2. Following this review period, 3 dilemmas were chosen to 
determine comprehension of stories and responses. The 3 
dilemmas included 3 different story themes and 3 different 
consequence conditions. Comprehension was determined by 
requesting that subjects explain the stories and responses 
in their own words. 
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3. Each protocol contains 6 examples of each consequence 
condition. Each consequence condition was examined for 
consistency of rejection rating across stories. When 
inconsistency was discovered it was addressed in the manner 
of the following example. 
11Why did you think the consequences for stealing 
the drug were good reasons for making a decision 
in the Heinz situation, while the consequences of 
hiring Mr. Lee were not good reasons in the 
Webster situ ati on?11 
4. The fourth step was comprised of a couple of general 
questions to further clarify the subject's response to the 
Rejection Scale. When subjects marked an item 11uncertain 11 
they were asked why the 11accept 11 or 11reject 11 choice was not 
suitable. In addition, subjects were asked if they could 
think of a better resppnse choice which was not listed. 
The structured interviews were conducted on an individual basis. 
They lasted approximately 15 mi nut es. 
Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT is a measure of moral 
preference designed by Rest (1979) (see Appendix A). According to 
Kohlberg (1979) the DIT is an instrument which assesses a broad 
spectrum of moral reasoning: "The DIT assesses recognition, 
comprehension, and preference, and thus indirectly spontaneous 
production (of moral reasoning)" (Kohlberg, 1979, p. xv). Kohlberg 
(1979) also comments on the reliability and validity of the DIT. 
The DIT can cl aim not only rel i abi 1 ity but al so construct 
validity as well, since results with it conform to expecta-
ti ans derived from the cognitive devel OPTienta 1 theory and 
cannot be accounted for by interpreting the test responses 
as other than cognitive developmental or other than moral 
(p. xiv). -
In addition, Kohlberg (1979) has compared the DIT ("the Minnesota 
measure") with his measure of moral development ("the Harvard 
measure). "From the point of view of the Harvard group, the 
moderate correlations between the DIT and our measure support the 
construct validity of the Havard measure as well as the Minnesota 
measure" 
(p. xiv). 
The DIT is an objective measure of moral preference. Subjects 
are required to read through six moral dilemmas and select a series 
of responses to best represent their moral preference. Response 
selections follow each dileITTT1a. Subjects are required to rank this 
selection of responses in terms of relative importance. Item 
selection on the DIT is largely governed by two processes, the 
ability to comprehend an item and the sense of an item•s conceptual 
adequacy (Lawrence, 1978). 
36 
The response choices on the DIT were selected from the transcripts 
of subjects who were assessed with Kohlberg•s interview technique. 
The issues and concerns which subjects typ;-cally raised in response 
to moral dileITTTlas from the Kohlberg interview were used as multiple 
choice answers on the DIT. All items on the DIT are matched by word 
length, syntactic complexity, and use of technical or specialized 
tenninology (Rest, 1979). 
DIT scoring yields a measure of how often various stages of 
reasoning are used to answer the dileITTT1as. The DIT score which is 
used most frequently in descriptions of moral reasoning is the P%. 
This P index refers to the percent of post conventional reasoning 
used by the subject throughout the DIT. The P index is derived in 
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the following way. 1) Each of the subject 1 s four choices to any one 
dilenma is differentially weighted. The first choice is weighted 4 
points, second choice 3 points, third choice 2 points, and the last 
choice is weighted 1 point. 2) The weights assigned to each stage 
are sunvned and multiplied times that stage number. 3) These stage 
products are summed across the six moral dilemmas so that each stage 
has one grand numerical value. 4) These values are divided by the 
total points possible to obtain individual stage percentages. 5) The 
P% is derived by adding the percentage values assigned to stages 5 
and 6. 
Rest (1979) reports test-retest reliability, using the P% as the 
dependent measure, in the range of .70 to .80. A number of 
reliability studies have been conducted with retest intervals ranging 
from one week to five months. The most typical retest interval, 
though, has been a two to three month range. Test-retest reliability 
with individual stage scores is generally lower, in the range of .50 
to .60. The standard error of measurement for the P% is 7.5% 
Cronbach's alpha was used to establish a measure of internal 
consistency regarding the P%. Alpha was .77 for the P index. 
Measures of convergent-divergent correlational validity have also 
been reported (Rest, 1979). The DIT correlates well with other 
measures of moral reasoning, such as measures of moral comprehension 
and Kohlberg's test. Correlations with moral comprehension range 
from .49-.65, and correlations with Kohlberg's measure of moral 
judgment range from .40-.70. Correlations between the DIT and 
measures of cognitive develo!)Tlent (not specifically moral reasoning) 
range from .20-.50. Correlations with measures of general aptitude 
are .40, and tests of personality .25-.35. In general, the DIT 
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carrel ates best with other measures of moral development, moderately 
with measures of general cognitive development, and poorly with 
measures of personality. 
The DIT protocols used in this study were hand scored by the 
principle investigator of this study according to the system briefly 
outlined above and detailed in Rest's (1979) scoring manual. This 
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scoring system yields stage percentages as well as a P index. 
Procedure 
The pilot study sample of 90 subjects (7th, 9th, and 11th 
graders) completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT). This was group 
administered and took approximately 45 minutes to complete. Specifi~ 
instructions for completing the instrument were included with the 
test, however, subjects were told: 
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people 
think about social problems. Different people have 
different opinions about right and wrong thus these 
problems have no absolutely right answer. Please answer 
all questions as completely as possible and expect to 
complete everything in approximately 50 minutes. 
The instrument was hand scored according to the procedures described 
in the Measures section . 
Following a one week interval the original sample of 90 subjects 
completed the Rejection Scale. This was administered in group 
fashion, preceded by the set of instructions used for the DIT. The 
Rejection Scale was hand scored according to the procedures described 
in the Measures section. 
Following a two week interval, the original sample of 90 subjects 
completed another Rejection Scale. The process and conditions of 
test administration were identical to the first administration. 
This second administration of the Rejection Scale was followed by the 
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Structured Interview. At least one week after completing the second 
Rejection Scale, 5 subjects from each age category were selected at 
random to participate in the Structured Interview. This interview 
was conducted on an individual basis, following the guidelines 
outlined in the Measures section. The interviews were recorded in 
narrative form and subsequently summarized across subjects in terms 
of the concerns detailed in the Measures section. Interviews lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. 
Main Study 
Subjects 
The subjects in this study included a total sample of 90 male and 
female junior high and high school students 30 from each grade of the 
7th, 9th, and 11th grades. This sample was selected from a small 
rural school system in north east Connecticut. The same schools were 
used for both the pilot and main study. However, contact between 
subjects across studies was probably minimal because students' 
schedules were mutually exclusive. Each group contained 30 subjects 
and was comprised of approximately equal numbers of males and 
females. The students were selected randomly from study halls which 
are part of every student's re qui red program. The students 
participated through an arrangement made with parents, students, 
teachers, and school administrators, after a complete explanation of 
the project was offered. Student confidentiality was maintained as 
no student names were used in the processing or reporting of results. 
Thi s project was reviewed and approved by the superintendent, 
director of special education, and school principals. In addition, 
it was reviewed and approved by the Human Subjects Review Board at 
the University of Rhode Island. 
Measures 
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Rejection Scale. The Rejection Scale is a measure of moral 
maturity based on the subject's rejection of lower stage reasoning. 
Carroll and Rest (1981) demonstrated that rejection of lower stage 
reasoning increases with age and moral maturity. Carroll and Rest 
(1981) conclude, "when individuals give up thinking at stages lower 
than their modal stage, this can be viewed as developmental advance 
in the sense of consolidation at the higher stage" (p. 43). This 
notion of measuring moral maturity through rejection of reasoning led 
to the development of Carroll's objective instrument. Like the DIT, 
Carroll's measure is based on Kohlberg's six stage model. His 
measure consists of four moral dilemmas which are each followed by 
reasons for acting or not acting in the situation. Ten reasons, two 
at each of Kohlberg's stages 1-5, comprise the response choices. 
Subjects are expected to rate each reason in terms of one of four 
categories: 1) I accept the reason; 2) I tend to accept the reason; 
3) I tend to reject the reason; or 4) I reject the reason. Scoring 
ranges from 1 point for every "I accept the reason" to 4 points for 
every "I reject the reason." In this manner a rejection rating is 
established. Theoretically the higher stage subjects should have 
higher rejection ratings. 
Criterion group validity was established in Carroll's 1981 study 
as older subjects (11th graders) did indeed score higher rejection 
ratings than younger subjects (7th graders). Carroll (1974) also 
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reports internal consistency for each stage (1 through 5), using Hoyt 
reliability coefficients, in the range of .48-.74. 
The Rejection Scale used in this study was altered fran Carroll's 
version in order to test a new set of hypotheses (see appendix B for 
a copy of this new Rejection Scale). Reliability (test-retest) and 
validity (construct and criterion group) were established for this 
new Rejection Scale in a pilot study. 
This new Rejection Scale consists of six moral dilerrnnas which are 
currently being used in three other major moral assessment devices. 
Each of the six dilenmas has three forms to depict three consequence 
conditions (mild, moderate, and severe). This yields a total of 18 
dilenmas (six stories X three consequence conditions). The main 
feature of this new Rejection Scale is the representation of three 
consequence conditions along with six different story themes. 
The test is designed to counter balance the order of presentation of 
story theme so that each story theme appears in each of the six 
positions an equal number of times over the entire sample. Each 
consequence condition is paired with each story theme an equal number 
of times, and counter balanced for order over the entire sample. 
A set of three response choices follows each story. These 
response choices are based on Kohlberg's three level system so that 
each level is represented among the response choices. Levels are 
used to code responses, rather than stages, because the levels seem 
to be based on clearer structural and conceptual distinctions. 
Subjects must rate each response choice in tenns of the following 
categories: G, this is a good reason; U, I am uncertain about this 
reason; or P, this is a poor reason. Scoring ranges from O for every 
"G" response, 1 point for a "U" response and 2 points for a "P" 
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response. Scores are totaled for the level I answers to yield a 
rejection score for each story. This raw single story rejection 
score was used as one fonn of the dependent variable in the analysis 
to be described in the Results section of this proposal. A total 
rejection score can be obtained by summing all rejection scores of 
level I responses across all stories. This score was also used in 
the data analysis. 
This instrument was group administered. It took approximately 25 
minutes to complete. 
Procedure 
The Rejection Scale was administered in group fashion to a sample 
of ninety 7th, 9th, and 11th graders (n for each group= 30). This 
took approximately 25 minutes to complete. Specific instructions for 
completing the instrument were included with the test, however, 
subjects were given the same general instructions outlined in the 
Pilot Study. 
The Rejection Scale was hand scored according to the procedures 
outlined earlier, to yield: a) an individual's 18 rejection scores, 
(six stories x three consequence conditions), b) a total rejection 
score, c) a rejection score for each consequence condition, and d) a 
rejection score for each story. 
Subjects were thanked for their participation and any questions 
were answered regarding the purpose of the study. 
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CHAPTER IX 
HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS 
Hypo thesis One 
Story consequence (from mild to severe) is a functional aspect of 
the moral dilemma which interacts with the reasoner's structural 
capacity to yield differential effects on the moral reasoning of 
junior high afid high school students. This hypothesis leads to the 
following predictions about this structural-functional interaction. 
Predictions. 
la. The three different consequence conditions will yield 
results, in the fonn of rejection scores, which fonn a 
cumulative or Guttman scale. That is, a subject who rejects 
Level I reasoning in one consequence condition of a dilemma 
will reject Level I reasoning in all milder consequence 
conditions on that dilemma (or story). In other words, 
subjects who accept Level I reasoning in one consequence 
condition will accept it in all more severe consequence 
conditions. More specifically, this Guttman scale will 
contain seven cumulative steps and yield a coefficient of 
reproducibility greater than or equal to .85. The Guttman 
scale will prevail for each grade level, 7th, 9th, and 11th, 
as well as across the entire sample. 
lb. The total rejection scores across all dilemmas and ages will 
be greatest in the mild consequence condition, decrease in 
the moderate condition, and the rejection score total for 
the severe consequence condition should be the lowest. The 
consequence effect will prevail for each grade level, 7th, 
9th, and 11th, as well as across the entire sample. 
Hypo thesis Two 
The seven step rejection scale has criterion group validity as it 
depicts a developmental continuum between younger and older students. 
Predictions. 
2a. The seven step Guttman scale will show that 7th graders 
occupy a lower position on the scale than 9th graders, and 
both groups will be lower on this scale than 11th graders. 
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2b. Rejection scores will differ across grade level as the 7th 
graders will have the lowest rejection scores, 11th graders 
will have the highest rejection scores, and 9th graders will 
fall in between these two groups. This rejection score 
trend by age will hold in each consequence condition as well 
as across all consequence conditions. For example, given 
severe consequences, 7th graders will have the lowest 
rejection scores, followed by 9th graders, and 11th graders 
will have the highest rejection scores. 
Hypothesis Three 
The Story theme is a relevant functional aspect of moral 
reasoning as different story themes have differential effects on the 
moral reasoning of junior high and high school students. 
Predictions. 
3a. The six different story themes will yield different 
rejection scores across the entire sample. In addition, 
each age group, 7th, 9th, and 11th graders, will show a 
story theme effect. 
3c. The function~l importance of story theme will be 
demonstrated further as the stories will differ in their 
degree of scalability by consequence condition. 
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CHAPTER X 
RESULTS 
Pilot Study 
The Rejection Scale used in this study was altered from the 
standardized version (Carroll, 1974) in order to examine the specific 
hypotheses described earlier. Thus, the pilot study was designed to 
establish the psychometric properties of this new instrument. The 
analysis of the pilot data will be presented in this section in terms 
of test-retest reliability and validity (content, criterion group and 
concurrent). 
Reliability 
A total sample of 90 subjects completed two Rejection Scales with 
a two week interval between administrations. A total rejection score 
was calculated for each student on each administration of the 
Rejection Scale. A rejection score for each dile1T1Tia and each conse-
quence condition was also calculated by individual for each adminis-
tration of the Rejection Scale. The test-retest data by dilerrma, 
consequence condition and total score is summarized in Table 1. 
The test-retest reliability of the total score (two week 
interval), .90, is well beyond the acceptable psychometric standard 
for retest reliability as suggested by Aiken (1974). In addition, 
this value is greater than the test-retest reliabilities reported by 
Carroll, Kohl berg, and Rest in reference to their own instruments. 
The reliability coefficients for each dilemma and consequence 
condition are lower than the total score coefficient, which is 
consistent with general test theory (Aiken, 1974). However they 
account for 50 to 70 percent of the variance and exceed the general 
acceptable limit for retest reliability of individual test items 
(Aiken, 1974). 
In general, the figures in Table 1 suggest that the Rejection 
Scale is a consistent measure from one administration to the next. 
Furthermore, the items which comprise the Rejection Scale are all 
similar in their high level of consistency across administrations. 
Validity 
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Concurrent validity. The scores on the rejection scale were 
compared to scores obtained on the Defining Issues Test (DIT) by 
using a Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient. This 
correlation coefficient is .55. This value is high enough to 
indicate that the two measures are probably evaluating the same 
construct. In addition, the value is low enough to suggest that 
there may be a meaningful difference between the two instruments. 
Perhaps one value of this new Rejection Scale then, is its ability to 
measure something different about the construct of moral reasoning. 
Criterion group validity. The results of the pilot study were 
also evaluated with a three way analysis of variance by consequence 
condition, age (grade level) and story theme (see figure 3 for a 
sketch of this design). The variable of primary interest in this 
measure of va.lidity is age because moral reasoning is a developmental 
construct which should increase with age. Aiken (1974), and Rest 
(1979) report that the main purpose of criterion group validity is to 
Table 1 
Retest Reliability Coefficients By Dilemma, 
Consequence Condition and Total Score 
Di l e11111a, 
Consequence Condi ti on 
and Total Score 
Heinz 
Doctor 
Gail 
Joe 
Draft 
Webster 
Mild Consequences 
Moderate Consequences 
Severe Consequences 
Total Score 
Note. N = 90 
Retest Correlation 
Coefficient 
. 81 
.70 
. 74 
• 82 
• 78 
.70 
. 76 
.76 
• 82 
.90 
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demonstrate that subjects who ought to have different scores on a 
measure do in fact have different scores . Thus we expected older 
subjects to have higher scores, indicating a more advanced level of 
moral reasoning, than younger subjects. 
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As outlined in Table 2 the three way ANOVA reports a significant 
age effect (F = 5.54, df = 2/87, p~.005). However, the interaction 
of age and consequence is also significant (F = 5.35, df = 4/174, p < 
.0004) so the effects of age must be interpreted in terms of the 
consequence conditi ans. In addition, the issue of homogeneity of 
variance must be addressed. 
The results of the F-Maximum Test for Homogeneity of Variance 
(Hays, 1973) indicate that the variances among the 54 cells were 
heterogeneous (Fmax = 11.25, K/df = 54/29, p < .01). However, since 
scores can only range from 0-2 we are dealing with a restricted range 
such that variances are considerably less than 1.0. When dealing with 
extremely small variances a significant Fmax could result from 
trivial differences in variance (e.g., smallest variance= .20, 
largest variance = .80, Fmax = 4.0). In addition, Hays (1973) 
firmly asserts that the effect of heterogeneity of variances on the 
F-distribution will most likely be negligible. 
Ordinarily, other things being equal, this assumption 
of hanogeneous variances can be vi al ated without 
serious risk, provided that the number of cases in 
each sample is the same (Hays, 1973, p. 482). 
A test for homogeneity of variance before the analysis 
of variance has rather limited practical utility, and 
modern opinion holds that the analysis of variance can 
and should be carried on without a preliminary test of 
variances, especially in situations where the number 
of cases in the various samples can be made equal 
(Hays, 1973, p. 484). 
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Table 2 
Three by Three by Six Analysis of Variance on Pilot Data Rejection Scores 
by Age, Consequence, and Dilemma 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares D. F. Squares F Probability 
Age 28.24 2 14.12 5.54 (. .005 
Di 1 enma 110.10 5 22.00 20.60 l. 001 
Consequence 120.96 2 60. 48 164.31 <'...001 
Error (age) 221. 58 87 2.55 
Age/0 i 1 errrn a 8.20 10 .82 • 77 <.. 66 
Age/Consequence 7.88 4 1. 97 5.35 ~.001 
Dilerrma/Consequence 22.26 10 2.23 7.47 <_.001 
Error (Dilenma, Age/ 
Oil emma) 464.97 435 1.07 
Error (Consequence, 
Age/Consequence) 64.05 174 .37 
Age/Consequence/Dilerrma 2.86 20 .143 .48 ~ • 97 
Error (Age/Consequence/ 
Dilenma) 259.33 870 .30 
Note. n per ce 11 = 30 
N total sample= 90 
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Based on Hays 1 (1973) review of hanogeneity of variance and the equal 
cell size in this study, the statistical analysis based on the 
three-way AN OVA was continued. 
The interaction of age and consequence was followed up with 
simple effects tests (see Table 3, page 52) which revealed that there 
was an age effect at mild and moderate but not at severe consequences 
(Age/Mild, F = 11.35, d.f. = 2/174, p [ .01; Age/Moderate, F = 4.91, 
d.f. = 2/174, p ~- .01; Age/Severe, F = 1.56, d.f. = 2/174, N.S.). 
Simple effects tests of consequences at each age (see Table 4, page 
52) revealed that there was a significant consequence effect at all 
three ages (Consequence/7th, F = 8. 78, d .f. 2/174, p < .01; 
Consequence/9th, F = 20.3, d.f. = 2/174, p <.01; Consequence/11th, F 
= 30.14, d .f. = 2/174, p < .01). 
The significant simple effects tests were followed by the Newman-
Keul s Analysis to determine specific differences within ages and 
consequence conditions. The results depicted in Figure 4 (see page 
53) show that all three ages are significantly different fran each 
other under both mild and moderate consequence conditions. Ninth 
graders achieve higher scores than seventh graders, and eleventh 
graders achieve higher scores than ninth graders. Figure 5 ( see page 
54) shows that the differences between mild, moderate and severe 
consequence conditions are all significant at each age level. Mild 
consequences result in higher scores for all ages, canpared to 
moderate and severe consequences, while moderate consequences result 
in higher scores than severe consequences. 
Based on the ANOVA, simple effects tests, and Newman-Keuls it can 
be concluded that the Rejection Scale effectively distinguishes 
between all three age groups, with the significant differences 
Table 3 
Simple Effects Tests On The Interaction of Age At Each 
Consequence Condition (Pilot Study) 
Consequence 
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Age Condi ti on F Probability 
Across 7th, 9th Mild 11. 35 ~ - .01 
and 11th Grade Moderate 4.91 ~ - .01 
Severe 1. 56 N. S. 
Note. d .f. = 2,174 
n per c e 11 = 30 
Table 4 
Simple Effects Tests On The Interaction of Consequence 
At Each Age (Pilot Study) 
Consequence 
Condi ti on 
Across Mild, 
Moderate and 
Severe Consequences 
Note. d.f. = 2,174 
n per c e 11 = 30 
Age 
7th 
9th 
11th 
F 
8.78 
20.30 
30.14 
Probability 
L .01 
~ - .01 
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Figure 4. The Difference Between Ages At Each Consequence 
Condition on Pilot Data Rejection Scores 
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Figure 5. The Difference Between Consequence Conditions At 
Each Age on Pilot Data Rejection Scores 
occurring at the mild and moderate consequence condition. 
Furthermore, the significant differences between consequence 
conditions hold for each age group. The rejection scale, then, has 
criterion group validity with reference to the seventh, ninth, and 
eleventh grade population sampled in this study. 
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Content validity. Aiken (1974) suggests that a test has content 
validity if it contains a representative sample of items from the 
universe of items commonly used to evaluate the construct. The 
Rejection Scale contains moral dilemmas selected from three major 
mora 1 assessment instruments (Kohl berg I s, Rest I s and Carro 11 1 s). 
However, these researchers have not developed a categorization of 
moral content to determine if their sample dilemmas are in fact 
representative. The response format and response selections are 
modeled after two of these instruments (Rest's and Carroll 1 s) which 
are based on the third (Kohlberg1 s). 
Structured interview. Interviews were conducted with five 
subjects from each of the three age categories. The main purpose of 
the interviews was to evaluate whether subjects understood the stories 
and response choices and to determine some of the factors which 
subjects considered important in their evaluation of the moral 
dilemmas. 
All subjects understood the stories, directions and pertinent 
responses well enough to explain them in their own words. In fact, 
without looking back at their test booklet, subjects were able to 
recall in great detail information such as the amount of money the 
drug cost in the Heinz story, the jail term in the Draft story, and 
the amount of money saved by Joe in the Joe story. 
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All subjects clearly understood the level one answers, which are 
used in scoring the Rejection Scale. However, approximately 50% of 
the 7th and 9th graders interviewed had a difficult time making the 
connection between the consequences in the Draft and Joe stories and 
the level one responses. Sane students reported "I didn't know what 
you meant by too much trouble 11 ••• "I didn't know you meant the trouble 
Joe would get into 11 ••• "community service and paying money, I didn't 
take that to mean troubl e11 • Even though some subjects did not 
immediately understand this connection, their scores fit the expected 
pattern according to the influence of consequences. 
Subjects were also asked to explain why they thought Level I 
reasoning was acceptable in some instances and unacceptable in 
others. Subjects reported that the endings made a difference in how 
they evaluated the level one answers "doing a little work is nothing 
next to going to jail for life. 11 In cases where the consequences did 
not appear to make a difference subjects were asked what it would take 
to make a difference to them. In most cases the students gave a 
response which was less severe than one of the originals. In response 
to the Gail story, for example, one ninth grader reported 11I guess if 
I had to stay after school for a week I would tel 1 the teacher . 11 When 
it was pointed out how this answer was 1 ess severe than one of the 
originals the subject agreed and changed her mind regarding her 
original answer. A few other subjects had similar experiences. When 
they were required to review their protocol and justify their response 
choices some of them changed their answers. These few instances are 
· part of test error . 
In addition to specific consequences subjects also reported that 
other issues were relevant in their response choices. For example, 
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most subjects made a distinction between dilemmas such as "life and 
death is more important than somebody's business 11 (comparing the 
doctor story with the Webster story), and 11the personal relationship 
makes it worth it (in the Heinz story) but here (in the Draft story) 
it's just himself 11 • 
In general, subjects seemed to understand the dilemmas, responses, 
and directions for completing the instrument • . The seventh graders, 
however, needed a concrete example in their directions before they 
fully understood. In addition, seventh graders frequently asked for 
-
cl arifi cation throughout the task. Seventh graders completed the 
instrument in 35 minutes while ninth and eleventh graders required 
only 20 minutes. Some students had difficulty making the connections 
between consequences in the story and reference to those consequences 
in the response choices. This did not seem to influence the results 
significantly as the scores still fit the expected pattern based on 
the consequence effect. Finally, subjects at all ages reported that 
they noticed the differences in consequences across stories and this 
affected their response choices. The results from the ANOVA reported 
earlier strongly support this. Other relevant factors reported by 
subjects include theme issues such as personal relationship and life 
and death. 
Pilat Summary 
The procedures chosen to evaluate reliability and validity of the 
Rejection Scale indicate that this new instrument has strong 
psychometric properties. For example, test-retest reliability is .90 
while the coefficients for individual test items ranges from .70-.82. 
In addition, the Rejection Scale correlates .55 with the Defining 
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Issues Test. This indicates that the two measures are probably 
evaluating the same construct and correlation coefficient is low 
enough to suggest that the two instruments may. be different in some 
meaningful way. Thus, this new Rejection Scale may be measuring 
sanething different about the construct of moral reasoning. 
The consequence effect which we expected from the Rejection Scale 
is significant at the p < .001 level for all ages sampled. 
Furthermore, the Rejection Scale effectively distinguishes the three 
ages from each other. Follow-up analysis shows that the mild a~d 
moderate consequence conditions are responsible for making this 
distinction. We expect an increase in moral reasoning between 
seventh, ninth, and eleventh grade, which the Rejection Scale measures 
quite effectively. 
Finally, the structured interview showed that all three ages 
understood and interacted appropriately with the test materials. 
However, seventh graders needed more clarification and concrete 
examples to understand the directions. Subjects reported that they 
noticed differences in story consequences which made a difference in 
their evaluation of level one responses. Furthermore, they identified 
themes or moral issues, such as life and death and personal 
relationships, which also made a difference in the evaluation of level 
one responses. 
In conclusion, the Rejection Scale appears to be psychometrically 
sound based on the analyses described above. Research with different 
populations and other measures of reliability and validity would 
further clarify this issue. 
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Main Study 
The Rejection Scale reviewed above was used to address three major 
questions: 1) as story consequences increase in severity, will 
individuals be less likely to reject consequence level reasoning 
(Kohl berg's Level I, preconventional) as an appropriate answer to 
moral dilemnas? 2) Is there a develoµnental trend between 7th, 9th, 
and 11th graders regarding this consequence effect? 3) Do story 
themes have differential effects on the moral reasoning of junior high 
and high school students? 
The data from the Rejection Scale was evaluated with Scalogram 
Analysis (Edwards, 1957) by consequence condition, age, and story 
theme. In addition, the data was evaluated by analysis of variance 
with repeated measures by grade level, consequence condition and story 
theme (see Figure 3 for a sketch of this design). The results of this 
main study will be presented in this section to address the three 
questions outlined above. Each question will be presented in terms of 
its hypothesis and predictions, followed by a summary of the 
appropriate statistical analysis. 
Hypo thesis One 
Story consequence (mild, moderate, and severe) is a functional 
aspect of the moral dilemma which interacts with the reasoner's 
structural capacity to yield differential effects on the moral 
reasoning of junior high and high school students. Based on this 
hypothesis it was predicted that the consequences would form an 
ordered scale, based on their severity, which would confonn to the 
characteristics of a Guttmann scale. In addition, an analysis of 
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variance, including follow-up tests, should reveal a significant 
consequence effect which should hold for each grade level as well as 
the entire sample. 
Scalogram analysis. Scalogram Analysis is the appropriate 
statistical technique for evaluating data to determine whether it 
meets the conditions of a cumulative or Guttmann scale (Edwards, 
1957). Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 summarize the Scalogram Analysis by 
grade and dilerrma (see pages 61-64). The coefficient of 
reproducibility by age ranges fran .92 to .96, well beyond the .85 
mark necessary to consider the data scalable (Edwards, 1957). In 
addition, the coefficient of reproducibility by dilemma ranges from 
.90 to .95 and the dilemma within age coefficients range from .88 to 
1.0. The results from all three grades and all six dilemmas indicate 
that consequences have differential effects on moral reasoning. The 
Scalogram Analysis shows that consequence level reasoning is more 
difficult to reject when consequences are severe, as opposed to 
moderate and mild, and moderate consequences make it more difficult to 
reject level 1 reasoning than mild ones. Thus a seven step Guttman 
scale can be fanned (see Tables 5-8) where each successive step 
represents a higher stage as it becomes increasingly more difficult to 
reject level 1 reasoning. The data clearly indicates that subjects 
often accept level 1 reasoning under severe consequence conditions 
while rejecting it under the mild condition within the same dilemma. 
Clearly, consequences have a significant effect on moral reasoning 
according to the Scalogram Analysis. 
Analysis of variance. The data from the main study and the 
canbined data (main and pilot study) were both evaluated with a three 
by three by six ANOVA by consequence condition, age (grade level) and 
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Table 5 
Scalogram Analysis For Grade Seven By Di 1 emma 
Consequence* Oil emma** 
Condition 
C1 C2 C3 1 2 3 4 5 6 x Stage 
0 0 0 55 10 42 55 30 75 45 1 
1 0 0 8 5 2 0 5 6 4 2 
2 0 0 
1 1 0 10 32 12 8 12 6 13 3 
1 1 1 
2 1 0 3 12 5 5 13 2 7 4 
2 1 1 
2 2 0 3 12 10 10 12 2 8 5 
2 2 1 2 3 0 2 0 0 1 6 
2 2 2 13 20 18 13 17 2 14 7 
Errors 5 6 12 6 12 6 8 
Average 
Stage Rating 2. 46 4.0 3.12 2.7 3. 45 1. 47 2. 87 
Coefficient of 
Reproducibility • 95 . 93 • 88 • 93 . 88 . 93 • 92 
Note. Response frequency is in percentage units. 
* c1 = Mild, c2 = Moderate, C~ = Severe 
** 1 = Heinz, 2 = Doctor, 3 = ai 1 , 4 = Joe, 5 = Draft, 
6 = Webster 
N = 60 (repeated across dil enmas) 
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Table 6 
' Scalogram Analysis For Grade Nine By Dilemma 
Consequence* Oil emma** 
Condition 
C1 C2 C3 1 2 3 4 5 6 x Stage 
0 0 0 32 10 27 32 25 68 32 1 
1 0 0 7 5 8 5 2 10 6 2 
2 0 0 
1 1 0 27 20 17 8 22 8 17 3 
2 1 0 
1 1 1 8 8 7 13 5 5 8 4 
2 2 0 
2 1 1 2 27 7 12 17 0 11 5 
2 2 1 2 8 5 5 5 0 4 6 
2 2 2 8 13 22 18 18 3 14 7 
Errors 15 8 8 7 7 5 8 
Average 
Stage Rating 2.7 4.2 3.7 3.6 3.8 1. 6 3.3 
Coefficient of 
Reproducibility . 85 . 92 .92 . 93 . 93 • 95 • 92 
Note. Response frequency is in percentage units. 
* c1 = Mild, c2 = Moderate, C~ = Severe 
** 1 = Heinz, 2 = Doctor, 3 = ail, 4 = Joe, 5 = Oraf t, 6 = Webster 
N = 60 (repeated across dilemmas) 
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Table 7 
Seal ogram Analysis For Grade El even By Dilemma 
Consequence* Oil emma** 
Condition 
C1 C2 C3 1 2 3 4 5 6 x Stage 
0 0 0 22 7 20 18 18 50 22 1 
1 0 0 3 0 3 8 0 12 4 2 
2 0 0 
1 1 0 25 25 27 7 17 8 18 3 
2 1 0 
1 1 1 10 7 13 7 18 12 11 4 
2 2 0 
2 1 1 7 25 8 18 18 10 14 5 
2 2 1 3 15 5 5 5 0 6 6 
2 2 2 20 22 23 32 18 5 20 7 
Errors 10 0 0 5 5 3 4 
Average 
Stage Rating 3.7 4.8 3.9 4.5 4.0 2.4 3.9 
Coefficient of 
Reproducibility .90 1.0 1.0 . 95 . 95 9.7 • 96 
Note. Response frequency is in percentage units. 
* c1 = Mild, c2 = Moderate, C~ = Severe 
** 1 = Heinz, 2 = Doctor, 3 = ail, 4 = Joe, 5 = Draft, 
6 = Webster 
N = 60 (repeated across d il e1T1T1as ) 
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Table 8 
Scalogram Analysis Totals For All Three Grades and all Six Dilemmas 
Consequence* Grade Di 1 ernna** 
Condition 
Ct C2 C3 7 9 11 x 1 2 3 4 5 6 Stage 
0 0 0 45 32 22 33 36 9 30 35 24 64 1 
1 0 0 4 6 4 5 6 3 4 4 2 9 2 
2 0 0 
1 1 0 13 17 18 16 21 26 19 8 17 7 3 
2 1 0 
1 1 1 7 8 11 9 7 9 8 8 12 6 4 
2 2 0 
2 1 1 8 11 14 11 9 21 8 15 16 4 5 
2 2 1 1 4 6 4 2 9 3 4 3 0 6 
2 2 2 14 14 20 16 14 18 18 21 18 3 7 
Errors 8 8 4 7 10 5 7 6 8 5 
Average 
Stage Rating 2.87 3.3 3.9 3.4 3.0 4.3 3.6 3.6 3.8 1.8 
Coefficient of 
Reproducibility .92 .92 .96 .93 .90 . 95 .93 .94 .92 . 95 
Note. Response frequency is in percentage units. 
*Ct= Mild, C2 = Moderate, C3 = Severe 
- 1 = Heinz, 2 = Doctor, 3 = Gail, 4 = Joe, 5 = Draft, 
6 = Webster 
N = 60 (repeated across dilernnas) 
story theme (see Figure 3). The variable of interest with respect to 
hypothesis one is consequence. 
As outlined in Table 9 (page 66), a significant consequence effect 
was found (F = 107.73, d.f. = 2/174, P<. . 001). However, the 
interactions of consequence and age as well as consequence and dilemma 
are also significant (F = 2.59, d.f. = 4/174, p '- .04 and F = 5.95, 
d.f. = 10/870, P<'.'.: .001). Therefore the effects of consequence must 
be interpreted in terms of age and dilemma. In addition, the issue of 
homogeneity of variance will be addressed. 
While the interactions may be statistically significant, the issue 
of practical significance should also be addressed. Table 11 reports 
the proportion of variance accounted for by each of the variables and 
interactions for the main study and the combined data from the pilot 
and main study (Hays, 1973). Each interaction term accounts for 1 to 
5 percent of the variance in the main study, while the main effect for 
consequence accounts for 24 percent of the variance. The significant 
interaction effects, then, could be considered trivial. Therefore, 
even though the interactions will be explored in more detail with 
simple effects tests and Newman-Keuls, the main effect of consequence 
is fairly straightforward. 
The results of the F-Maximum Test for Homogeneity of Variance 
(Hays, 1973) indicate that the variances among the 54 cells were 
heterogeneous (Fmax = 10.15, K/d.f. = 54/29, pL. .01). As reported 
earlier, Hays (1973) claims 
the assumption of homogeneous variances can be violated 
without serious risk, provided that the number of cases 
in each sample is the same (p. 482) ••• modern opinion 
holds that the analysis of variance can and should be 
carried on without a preliminary test of variances, 
especially in situations where the number of cases in 
the various samples can be made equal (484). 
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Table 9 
Three by Three by Six Analysis of Variance on Rejection Scores 
From Main Study By Age, Consequence, and Dilemma 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares D.F. Squares F Probability 
Age 30.97 2 15.48 5.03 < .009 
Dilemma 110. 35 5 22.07 20.40 ~.001 
Consequence 90. 71 2 45.36 107.73 4... .001 
Error (age) 267.76 87 3.08 
A ge/D i l errma 9.12 10 .91 • 84 L .59 
Age/Consequence 4.36 4 1.09 2.59 L .04 
Dilenma/Consequence 16. 04 10 1. 60 5.95 ..(. .001 
Error (Dilemma, Age/ 
Dilerrma) 470.70 435 1.08 
Error (Consequence, 
Age/Consequence) 73. 26 174 .42 
Age/Consequence/Dilenma 2.97 20 .15 .55 L .95 
Error (Age/Consequence/ 
Dilerrma) 234.66 870 .27 
Note. n per cell = 30 
N total sample= 90 
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Table 10 
Three by Three by Six Analysis of Variance on Combined Rejection Scores 
From The Pilot and Main Study By Age, Consequence, and Dilemma 
Sum of Mean 
Source Squares D. F. Squares F Probability 
Age 57.50 2 28.75 10.56 <'.. .001 
Dilemma 212.37 5 42.47 39.97 C::::::. 001 
Consequence 209.86 2 104.93 267.90 < .001 
Error (age) 481. 99 177 2. 72 
Age/Dilemma 9.44 10 . 94 .89 <C. • 54 
Age/Consequence 11. 71 4 2.93 7.48 <'.'.: .001 
Di l errnna/Consequence 36.09 10 3.61 12.38 .c::: .001 
Error (Dilemma, Age/ 
Oil errnna) 940. 41 885 1.06 
Error (Consequence, 
Age/Consequence) 138. 65 354 .39 
Age/Consequence/Dilemma 3.01 20 .15 .52 <: • 96 
Error (Age/Consequence/ 
Oil emma) 516. 00 1770 .29 
Note. n per cell = 60 
N total sample= 180 
Table 11 
The Proportion of Variance Accounted For by 
Variables in The Main Study and Main/Pilot Combined 
Proportion Variance Accounted For 
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Variable Main Study* Main/Pilot Combined** 
Age 
Oil emma 
Consequence 
Age/Consequence 
Dilemma/Consequence 
Note. * N = 90 
** N = 180 
1% 
10% 
24% 
1% 
5% 
2% 
5% 
15% 
1% 
3% 
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Based on Hays• (1973) review of this issue and the equal cell size in 
this study, the statistical analysis based on the three-way AN0VA was 
continued. 
The interaction of consequence and age was followed up with 
simple effects tests (see Table 12, page 70) which revealed that 
there was a consequence effect at each age (Consequence/7th grade, F 
= 19.06, d.f. = 2/174, p <'. .01; Consequence/9th grade, F = 40.68, 
d. f. = 2/174, p <.... 01; Consequence/11th grade, F = 29. 70, d. f. = 
2/174, p / .01). Similar results were obtained from the combined 
analysis of pilot and main study (see Table 12). 
The significant simple effects were followed by the Newnan-Keuls 
analysis to determine specific differences within consequence 
conditi ans and ages. The results depicted in Figure 6 (see page 7 3) 
show that consequence conditions are significantly different from-
each other at all three ages with the largest differences occurring 
for ninth and eleventh graders. Similar results are found with the 
combined data ( see Figure 7). At a 11 three ages mild co nse quenc es 
result in higher scores than moderate and severe consequences while 
moderate consequences result in higher scores than severe. 
Figure 8 (see page 75) shows that for the main study sample, 
there are significant differences between all three ages at the mild 
consequence condition while the moderate condition distinguishes 9th 
from 11th and llt h from 7th graders, but not 7th from 9th graders. 
The severe condition makes the same distinction but at a lower level 
of significance. The combined data shows a similar pattern of 
significance. Mild consequences distinguish all three ages, and 
moderate consequences make the same distinctions but the level of 
significance is higher between 9th and 11th graders than it is 
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Table 12 
Simple Effects Tests On The Interaction Of Consequences 
At Each Age (Main Study and Combined Data) 
Consequence Age F 
Condition (Grade) Main 
Across Mild, 7th 19.06 
Moderate, and 9th 40. 68 
Severe Consequences 11th 29. 70 
Note. d.f. Main Study= 2,174 
d.f. Combined Study= 2,354 
n per cell Main Study= 30 
Ratio 
Combined 
45.12 
100. 03 
140. 91 
n per cell Combined Study= 60 
Table 13 
Probability 
Main Combined 
..::· .01 < .01 
• 01 < . 01 
< .01 ·< .01 
Simple Effects Tests On The Interaction Of Age 
At Each Consequence Condition (Main Study and Combined Data) 
Age F Ratio Consequence 
Condition (Grade) Main Combined 
Across 7th, 
9th and 11th grade 
Mild 
Moderate 
Severe 
22.18 
14. 52 
3.66 
Note. d.f. Main Study= 2,174 
d.f. Combined Study = 2,354 
n per cell Main Study= 30 
n per c e 11 Combined Study = 60 
53.02 
30. 36 
4.49 
Probability 
Main Combined 
<. • 01 
<. • 05 
<. .01 
< • 01 
<. . 05 
between 7th and 9th graders. Severe consequences only distinguish 
between 11th and 7th graders. 
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The interaction of consequence and dilemma was followed up by 
simple effects tests (see Table 14, page 79). This revealed that 
there was a consequence effect at each dilemma (consequence/Heinz, F = 
15.53, d.f. = 2/870, p ~ .01; Doctor, F = 75.32, d.f. = 2/870, p < 
.01; Gail, F = 21.82, d.f. = 2/870, p <. .01; Joe, F = 20.18, d.f. = 
2/870, p < .01; Draft, F = 57.11, d.f. = 2/870, p < .01; Webster, F = 
7.75, d.f. = 2/870, p <: . • 01). Similar effects were obtained from the 
combined analysis of pilot data and main study (see Table 15). In 
addition, simple effects tests of dilemma at each consequence 
condition revealed that there was a significant dilemma effect at all 
three consequence conditions (dilenma/mild consequences, F = 46.95, 
d.f. = 5/870, p~ .01; moderate consequences, F = 35.90, d.f. = 5/870, 
P< .01; severe consequences, F = 11.48, d.f. = 5/870, P< .01). The 
combined data yielded similar results. 
The significant simple effects were followed by a Newman-Kuels 
analysis to determine specific di ff er enc es within consequence 
conditions and dilerrmas. The results depicted in Figure 10 (see page 
82) show that all consequence conditions are significantly different 
from each other in three of the six dilemmas (Doctor, Gail, and 
Draft). In two other dilemmas there is a significant difference 
between severe ·and moderate consequences as well as the severe and 
mild consequence condition (Heinz and Joe). Finally, in the Webster 
dilemna there is a significant difference only between severe and- mild 
consequences. The results fran the combined data show a stronger 
effect as all dilerrmas have significant differences between all three 
consequence conditions. Thus, the consequence effect is clearly 
demonstrated in most dilemmas, and every dilemma has at least some 
significant consequence effects. 
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Hypothesis one summary. The consequence effect was significant in 
all forms of analysis. The Scalogram Analysis demonstrated that the 
moral dilerrmas could be arranged in the form of a cumulative or 
Guttman Scale based on the severity of consequences. For example, 
when subjects rejected level 1 reasoning in the severe consequence 
condition they also rejected it in all milder consequence conditions. 
This graded scale of difficulty by consequence condition held up for 
each age group, each moral dilemma, each dilemma and age combination, 
as well as when the data was totaled across all ages and dilemmas. 
The ANOVA demonstrated that there was a significant consequence 
effect at each age with the strongest effects occurring for 9th and 
11th graders. Furthermore, mild consequences were most effective at 
distinguishing the three ages, followed by moderate then severe. 
While mild consequences distinguished between all ages the moderate 
condition distinguished effectively between 9th and 11th and 11th and 
7th graders. The severe condition distinguished between 11th and 7th 
graders and 11th and 9th graders in the main study only. 
The consequence effect is clearly demonstrated in most dilemmas. 
Three dilerrmas show significant differences between all three 
consequence conditions. Two dilemmas show signific~nt differences 
between severe and moderate and between severe and mild consequences. 
One dilerrma has significant differences between mild and severe 
consequence conditions. Thus, every dilemma has at least some 
significant consequence effects. In general, the Scalogram Analysis 
and ANOVA show a very strong consequence effect, which is further 
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supported by the data presented in Table 11 that indicate the 
consequence variable accounts for 24% of the total variance. 
Hypothesis Two 
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The Rejection Scale has criterion group validity as it depicts a 
develoµnental continuLDTI between younger and older students. Based on 
this hypothesis it was predicted that 7th graders would occupy a lower 
position on the Guttman Scale than 9th graders, and both groups would 
be lower on this scale than 11th graders. It was also predicted that 
this relationship would hold for each dilenma. In addition, it was 
predicted that an ANOVA by age would show significance between the 
three groups at each consequence condition as well as a general effect 
across consequence condtions. 
Scalogram analysis. The Scalogram analysis reviewed earlier (see 
Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8) was one of the statistical techniques used to 
determine age effects. As outlined in Table 8, the 7th graders have a 
lower average stage rating than the 9th graders, and they are both 
lower than 11th graders (7th= 2.87, 9th= 3.3, 11th= 3.9). In 
addition, when individual dilenmas across ages are compared (see 
Tables 5, 6 and 7) all six dilennnas show the same develoµnental 
trend. In each case the lowest scores are obtained by 7th graders, 
middle scores are obtained by 9th graders, and 11th graders achieve 
the highest scores on each dilenma. The results from Scalogram 
Analysis, then, show a consistent age effect. 
Analysis of variance. The data from the main study and the 
combined data were both evaluated with a three by three by six ANOVA 
by age (grade level), consequence condition, and story theme (see 
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Figure 3 for a sketch of this design). The variable of interest with 
respect to hypothesis two is age (grade level). 
As outlined in Table 9, a significant age effect was found (F = 
5.03, d.f. = 2/87, p L .009). However the interaction of age and 
consequence is also significant (F = 2.59, d.f. = 4/174, p. ~ .04). 
Similar results were found with the combined data (see Table 10). 
Therefore, the effects of age must be interpreted in tenns of 
consequences. 
The interaction of age and consequence was followed up with simple 
effects tests (see Tables 12 and 13, page 70) which revealed that 
there was an age effect at each consequence condition (age/mild 
consequences, F = 22.18, d.f. = 2/174, p < .01; age/moderate 
consequences, F = 14.52, d.f. = 2/174, p < .01; age/severe 
consequences, F = 3.66, d.f. = 2/174, p < .05). Similar results were 
obtained from the combined analysis of pilot and main study (see Table 
13). 
The significant simple effects were followed by a Newman Keuls 
analysis to detennine specific differences within ages and consequence 
conditions. The results depicted in Figure 8 (see page 75) show that 
there is a significant difference between all ages at the mild 
consequence condition while the moderate consequence condition 
distinguishes 11th and 9th graders and 11th and 7th graders, but not 
7th and 9th graders. There is a significant difference between 7th 
and 11th graders at the severe consequence condition. The combined 
data reveal similar findings except 9th and 7th graders are 
distinguished at the moderate condition in addition to the other 
distinctions shown by the main study. 
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Figure 6 shows that there are significant differences between all 
consequence conditions at each age. This effect is most significant 
for the 9th and 11th graders. The combined data show a similar 
pattern of significance. 
Hypothesis two summary. The Rejection Scale has criterion group 
validity as it effectively distinguishes between 7th, 9th, and 11th 
graders. This was demonstrated with Scalogram Analysis as the 7th 
graders had a lower average stage rating than the 9th graders and they 
were both lower than the 11th graders. This trend was matched without 
-
exception by all six moral dilemmas. 
The developmental trend was also demonstrated with Analysis of 
Variance. There. was a significant age effect at each consequence 
condition with the strongest effect occurring at the mild consequence 
condition. The mild condition distinguishes all three ages while the 
moderate condition distinguished effectively between 9th and 11th, and 
11th and 7th graders. The severe condition distinguished between 11th 
and 7th graders and, in the main study, 11th and 9th graders. In 
general the Scalogram Analysis and ANOVA show a strong developnental 
effect across the three age groups when the data is analyzed by 
consequence condition, dilemma, and total scores. 
Hypothesis Three 
Story theme is a relevant functional aspect of moral reasoning as 
different story themes have differential effects on the moral 
reasoning of junior high and high school students. Based on this 
hypothesis it was predicted that the six story themes would yield 
different average stage ratings, the coefficient of reproducibility 
would vary across stories and the stories would differ according to 
80 
their total rejection scores. Scalogram Analysis was used to evaluate 
the story themes in terms of their average stage ratings and 
coefficients of reproducibility. Analysis of variance was used to 
evaluate the story themes in terms of differences in rejection scores. 
Scalogram analysis. Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 (see pages 61-64) 
summarize the Scalogram Analysis by grade and dilemma. The dilemma 
effect can be shown by comparing the average stage ratings across 
dilemmas. This is done by age as well as across the entire sample. 
Each age group shows the same relationship between dilemmas in terms 
of the average stage rating (see Tables 5, 6 and 7). The average 
stage ratings ranged from 1.47 to 4.0 for 7th graders, 1.6 to 4.2 for 
9th graders, and 2. 4 to 4. 8 for 11th graders. The rank ordering of 
these dilemmas by average stage rating is the same for all three grade 
levels. The average stage rating across the entire sample ranges from 
1.8 to 4.3 (see Table 8). Thus, there are some fairly suggestive 
differences among the six dilemmas, in terms of their average stage 
ratings, whether the analysis is conducted by age or across the entire 
sample. 
The coefficients of reproducibility (C.0.R.) show a similar 
pattern of results. The C.0.R. across dilemmas ranged from .88 to .95 
for 7th graders, .85 to .95 for 9th graders, and .90 to 1.0 for 11th 
graders (see Tables 5, 6 and 7). The rank ordering of dilemmas by 
C.0.R., however, was different for each age. Thus, some fairly 
suggestive differences among the six dilemmas were evidenced in terms 
of C.0.R., but the dilemma effect interacts with age as some dilemmas 
are more scalable than others depending on the age of the subject. 
According to the Scalogram Analysis, then, the dilemma effect is 
very clear. The dilemmas are responded to with different levels of 
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Table 14 
Simple Effects Tests On The Interaction of Consequence 
At Each Dilemma (Main Study and Combined Data) 
Consequence 
Condi ti on 
F RATIO 
Oil emma Main Combined 
Across Mild, Heinz 15.53 
Moderate Doctor 75.32 
and Severe Gail 21. 82 
Consequences Joe 20 .18 
Draft 57 .11 
Webster 7.75 
Note. d.f. Main Study= 2/870 
d.f. Combined Data= 2/1770 
n per cell Main Study = 30 
n per cell Combined Study= 60 
Table 15 
202. 93 
173. 05 
56.78 
37 .19 
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16. 02 
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Simple Effects Tests On The Interaction of Dilemma 
At Each Consequence Condition (Main Study and Combined Data) 
F RATIO Consequence 
Condi ti on Oil emma Main Combined 
. Across All 
S i x D i l emm as 
Mild 
Moderate 
Severe 
Note. d.f. Main Study= 5/870 
46. 95 
35. 90 
11.48 
d .f. Combined Data = 5/1770 
n per cell Main Study= 30 
n per cell Combined Study= 60 
94. 55 
58. 04 
19.12 
Probability 
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Figure 11. The Difference Between Consequence Condition At 
Each Dilemma on Combined Data Rejection Scores 
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reasoning, as shown by the comparison of average stage ratings, and 
they are also different in terms of their scalability as measured by 
the C.0.R. 
Analysis of variance. The data from the main study, along with 
the combined data (main and pilot study) were both evaluated with a 
three by three by six AN0VA by consequence condition, age, and story 
theme (see Figure 3 for a sketch of the design, page 48). The 
variable of interest with respect to hypothesis three is dilemma. 
As outlined in Table 9 (see page 66), a significant dilemma effect 
was found (F = 20.4, d.f. = 5/435, p < .001). However, the 
interaction of dilemma and consequence was also significant (F = 5.95, 
d.f. = 10/870, P< .001). Therefore, the dilemma effect must be 
interpreted in terms of consequence. 
The interaction of dilemma and consequence was followed up by 
simple effects tests (see Tables 14 and 15, page 81). This revealed 
that there was a dilerrma effect at each consequence condition 
(dilemma/mild consequences, F = 46.95, d.f. = 5/870, p~ .01; 
dilemma/moderate consequences, F = 35.90, d.f. = 5/870, p<:::'. .01; 
dilemma/severe consequences, F = 11.48, d.f. = 5/870, P<- .01). 
Similar effects were obtained from the combined analysis of pilot data 
and main study (see Table 15). 
The significant simple effects were followed by a Newman-Kuels 
analysis to determine specific differences between dilerrmas at each 
consequence condition and between consequence conditions at each 
dilemma. The results depicted in Figure 12 (see page 86) show that 
within mild consequences all except three possible pairwise comparisons 
of the six dilemmas are significant. Two of the dilerrmas are 
significantly different from all of the other five dilemmas while the 
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remaining four dilemmas differ significantly from four out of five 
dilenmas. Under moderate consequence conditions one dilemma differs 
significantly from the five remaining dilemmas while the other five 
dilenmas differ significantly from four out of five dileJT1Tias. Under 
severe conditions only three dilemmas show significant differences. 
Thus significant differences were found between most dilemmas under 
mild and moderate consequence ·conditions and severe consequences 
generated s imi 1 ar scores across di l errrnas. The results from the 
combined analysis (see Figure 13) were similar. 
Thus, when consequences were held constant, meaningful differences 
emerged between dile!TITlas. Since mild consequences in one story may 
not equal mild consequences in another story, in terms of severity, 
subjects were asked to rank order all the consequence conditions in 
terms of severity. These results (see Table 16, page 88) show that 
the rank ordering of di 1 emmas by severity of consequences did not 
always match the rank ordering of dilemmas by rejection score (see 
Figures 12 and 13, pages 86 and 87). Thus, differences among di 1 emmas 
emerged due to more than just perceived story consequences. 
Hypothesis three summary. According to the Scalogram Analysis, the 
dileJT1Tia effect is fairly suggestive. The average stage rating shows 
that the dile!TITlas evoke different levels of reasoning. This relation-
ship ho 1 ds within each age and across ages. In addition, the coeffi-
cients of reproducibility (C.O.R.) vary across dilemmas within age 
groups to show that the dileJT1Tias differ in their rate of scalability. 
The dilelTITia effect is also supported by Analysis of Variance. 
There are several significant differences between dilerrmas at the mild 
and moder ate consequence con di ti ons. In addition, each dilemma shows 
a strong consequence effect. Thus, there are some very meaningful 
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Table 16 
The Rat i ng of Consequence By Age and Oil ernna*** 
Consequence MILO * MODERATE * SEVERE * ** 
Conditi on 
Grade Leve 1 7th 9th 11th x 7th 9th 11th x 7th 9t h 11th x x 
HEINZ 4.3 4.8 3. 8 4.3 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.3 8.9 9. 8 9. 6 9.4 7.0 
DOCTOR 3. 7 3. 3 3. 5 3. 5 5.6 7.1 7.5 6. 7 9. 9 10.0 9. 9 0 . 9 6.7 
JOE 2.3 2.9 2.3 2. 5 4.1 5.0 4.8 4.6 6. 1 6. 6 6.3 6.3 4.5 
GAIL 3.4 3. 5 2.5 3.2 5. 1 5. 1 4.4 4. 9 6.3 7.2 6.0 6. 5 4. C'l 
\~EB STER 4. 5 4.1 3.5 4.0 5. 6 6.3 6.0 6.0 7.5 7.7 7.8 7. 7 5.9 
DRAFT 3. 9 4. 6 4. 3 4.3 7. 2 7.6 7.7 7.5 3.7 8.8 8.6 3.7 5.3 
Note. * x = Aver age score by consequence condit i on acro ss age. 
** X = Grand average across all consequence condit i ons and ages. 
*** Consequence r at in g can range from 1- 10, 1 = mild , 10 = sever e. 
N = 90 
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differences between dilerrrnas when consequence and age are controlled, 
as shown by Scalogram Analysis and AN0VA. 
Surrrn ary 
A pilot study was conducted to evaluate the psychometric 
properties of the new Rejection Scale. This new Rejection Scale was 
designed to test three main hypotheses concerned with the effects of 
consequence and dilemma on moral reasoning of junior high and high 
school students. 
The reliability measures indicate that the Rejection Scale is a 
consistent measure from one administration to the next (test-retest 
reliability= .90). In addition, the individual test items (i.e., 
dilerrrnas and consequence conditions) were also consistent across 
administrations as test-retest reliability ranged from .70 to .82. 
Concurrent validity measures show that the Rejection Scale is 
measuring the same construct as another well known measure of moral 
reasoning (correlation with Defining Issues Test= .55). The 
correlation is high enough to indicate that the two measures are 
probably evaluating the same construct and it is low enough to suggest 
that the two instruments may be different in some meaningful way. 
Criterion group validity measures show that the Rejection Scale 
effectively distinguishes the three age groups from each other. 
Seventh graders achieve lower scores than ninth graders, who achieve 
lower scores than eleventh graders. Follow-up tests show that this 
occurs at mild and moderate consequences but not at the severe 
consequence condition. In addition, each age group showed the same 
significant consequence effect. 
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The structured interview showed that all three ages understood and 
interacted appropriately with the test materials. This adds a final 
vote of support that the new Rejection Scale is a psychometrically 
sound instrument. Research with different populations and other 
measures of reliability and validity would further clarify this issue. 
It was hypothesized that story consequences would influence the 
reasoning level of 7th, 9th, and 11th grade. This was confirmed with 
two forms of analysis. Scalogram Analysis demonstrated that the moral 
dilemmas could be arranged in the form of a cumulative or Guttman 
scale based on the severity of consequences. This graded scale of 
difficulty by consequence condition held for each age group, each 
moral dile1TJTia, each dilemna and age combination, as well as when the 
data was totalled across all ages and dilemmas. 
The Analysis of Variance demonstrated that there was a significant 
consequence effect at each age with the strongest effects occurring 
for 9th and 11th graders. Furthermore, mild consequences were most 
effective at distinguishing the three age groups, followed by moderate 
then severe consequences. 
The consequence effect was also demonstrated in most dilemmas. 
Most dilemmas distinguished between all three consequence conditions 
while some distinguished between only two. 
Thus, the Scalogram Analysis and Analysis of Variance show a very 
clear consequence effect. 
It was also hypothesized that the Rejection Scale would identify a 
developnental trend among 7th, 9th, and 11th graders. This was 
confirmed using two forms of analysis. 
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Scalogram Analysis demonstrated that 7th graders had a lower stage 
rating than 9th graders, who had a lower stage rating than 11th 
graders. This trend occurred without exception in all six dilemmas. 
The developmental trend was also demonstrated with Analysis of 
Variance. There was a significant age effect at each consequence 
condition with the strongest effect occurring at the mild consequence 
condition. 
In general, the Scalogram Analysis and ANOVA show a strong 
developmental effect across the three age groups when the data is 
analyzed by consequence condition, dilemma, and total scores. 
It was also hypothesized that story themes (dilemmas) would vary 
in terms of the level of reasoning they evoked. This was also 
confirmed using two farms of analysis. 
Scalogram Analysis demonstrates a fairly suggestive dilemma effect. 
The average stage rating shows that the dilemmas evoke different stages 
of reasoning. This effect holds within each age and across ages. In 
addition, the coefficients of reproducibility vary across dilemmas 
within age groups to show that the dilemmas differ in their rate of 
scalability. 
The dilemma effect is also supported by Analysis of Variance. 
There are several significant differences between dilemmas at the mild 
and moderate consequence cond iti ans. In addition, each dilemma shows 
a strong consequence effect. Thus, there are some very meaningful 
differences between dilerrmas when consequence and age are controlled, 
as shown by the Scalogram Analysis and Analysis of Variance. 
CHAPTER XI 
DISCUSS ION 
Purpose of Study, Review 
tl models have been used to understand the 
asoning. Kohlberg's simple stage model is the 
application. 
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that individuals will evidence the same stage of 
to different moral situations. In Kohlberg's 
Jught organization, the cognitive structure, is 
iable in the measurement of moral judgement. The 
~~-~~e moral situation is irrelevant. 
Many researchers have failed to find support for Kohlberg's 
model. The theoretical problem which is most relevant to this study 
is the lack of evidence for Kohlberg's notion of structured whole. 
Rest (1979) has addressed this concern with his complex stage 
model. He believes that "no pure direct assessment of cognitive 
structure exists that is unaffected by the specific task, content, and 
response characteristics of the situation" (p. 64). Thus, Rest has 
adapted Kohlberg's model to accommodate situational aspects along with 
structural capacity. The significance of these situational facators, 
then, is the foundation of the complex stage model. However, Rest has 
done little to explicate this facet. The situational factor is dealt 
with quite haphazardly in Rest's moral assessment device as the total 
array of potentially influential factors varies unsystematically. 
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One purpose of the present study was to systematically examine 
situational influence. This situational concern places this study 
within the bounds of a functional approach. The functional approach 
reviewed in this paper suggests that individuals are tuned into the 
payoff matrix of various situations and will respond to moral 
dilerrmas in a way that will bring about the greatest payoff (Liebert, 
1978). One of the most salient functional variables in moral 
situations is the objectively presented or subjectively perceived or 
anticipated consequences. As reported earlier, little has been done 
to examine this functional aspect in Kohlberg's or Rest's paradigm. 
Sane researchers, however, have examined this variable in 
children's studies on moral development. It has been demonstrated 
several times, using Piaget's paradign with young children, that 
subjects can be influenced to shift their reasoning depending on the 
severity of story consequences (Annsby, 1971; Costanzo, 1973; Gutkin, 
1972; Hewitt, 1975). In addition, story themes had differential 
effects on moral reasoning (Nucci, 1981). 
Moral reasoning, then, may best be understood through a combined 
structural-functional approach. This is an approach which 
illustrates how functional factors such as story consequences and 
story themes, impinge on the moral reasoning of individuals who 
differ in their structural capacity. A combined structural-functional 
model was explored in this research. 
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Pilot Study 
Sunmary and Review 
One problem with Rest's moral assessment device, as outlined 
earlier, is that it deals haphazardly with the situational factor. 
Another problem is that it evaluates moral reasoning by reviewing an 
individual's preference for higher stage reasoning (stages 5 and 6), 
largely ignoring lower stage reasoning without sufficient justifica-
tion. 
Carroll (1981) addressed this issue by designing an objective 
measure of moral reasoning based on rejection of lower stage 
reasoning. This technique is more comprehensive than Rest's because 
it examines moral reasoning in terms of lower stage patterns. 
However, the situational factors in Carroll's instrument are still 
allowed to vary unsystematically. The present study was designed to 
sytematically examine some of the situational factors by bringing 
them under experimental control. Carroll's instrt.nnent was adapted to 
measure situational factors. 
Since this new Rejection Scale was a revision of Carrol's 
standardized version, its psychometric properties were unknown. The 
pilot study was designed to establish the psychometric properties of 
this new instrt.nnent. 
The results from the pilot study indicate that the instrument is 
a reliable measure across a retest interval of two weeks. 
Furthermore, the items which comprise the Rejection Scale are all 
similar in their high level of consistency across administrations. 
In addition, its correlation with another well established moral 
assessment device suggests that the two measures are probably 
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evaluating the same construct while there may be some meaningful 
difference between them. The Rejection Scale, then, may be measuring 
scrnething different about the construct of moral reasoning. The 
Rejection Scale also has criterion group validity with reference to 
the seventh, ninth, and eleventh grade population sampled in this 
study. These three age groups achieved significantly different 
scores which were consistent with the expected developmental trend. 
Implications and Limitations 
One of the important features of this new Rejection Scale is that 
the test-retest reliability coefficients for test items and the total 
score test-retest reliability were much higher for the Rejection 
Scale than any of the other major moral assessment devices reviewed 
in this paper. This may be due partially to the control of story 
consequences as a situational variant. Since the most current 
research by Carroll and Rest (1981) and Rest (1979) suggest that 
situational variables influence moral reasoning, perhaps control of 
some of these variables will bring about more refined measurement of 
the construct. The higher test-retest reliability coefficients 
confirms this. Further research is needed to operationalize and 
control other relevant situational variables, such as story themes. 
Based on the present study we can assume that this future research 
may lead to even greater psychometric 
accomplishments in the measurement of moral reasoning. 
In addition, research should be conducted with other populations 
and different age groups, using various test-retest intervals. This 
type of research is necessary for generalization of the results 
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reported in this study. Since there has been only one study on this 
new Rejection Scale its psychometric properties should be accepted 
with some caution. 
The concurrent validity statistics reported on the new Rejection 
Scale suggest that the Rejection Scale is an accurate and unique 
measure of moral reasoning. One important feature of this concurrent 
validity is that the Rejection Scale may be measuring something 
unique or different than the Defining Issues Test (Rest's measure). 
The Rejection Scale was designed to be sensitive to features of moral 
reasoning that the Defining Issues Test (DIT) does not measure. More 
specifically, the Rejection Scale controls story consequence as a 
situational variant. Perhaps this additional situational control has 
distinguished the Rejection Scale from the DIT. The increase in 
reliability coefficients of the Rejection Scale over the DIT also 
support this. Additional research is needed to clarify and support 
this assumption. A thorough study of construct validity, correlating 
the Rejection Scale with other measures of moral developnent, 
cognitive development, achievement, intelligence, personality, etc. 
is necessary at this point. 
The criterion group validity results reported earlier show clear 
and consistent age trends on the new Rejection Scale. This age 
effect occurs for each dilemma and each consequence condition. Thus, 
the Rejection Scale seems to be sensitive to the age-developmental 
trend, with respect to moral reason i ng, which has been well 
documented in the past. In addition, the structured interviews 
revealed that the seventh, ninth and eleventh graders all interacted 
appropriately with the test materials. There was some concern at the 
beginning of this project that the younger subjects would not be able 
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to understand the task and would not interact appropriately with the 
test materials. In addition, concern was expressed about whether the 
story endings could communicate significant differences in 
consequences. All three age levels reported that the consequences 
seemed to vary across stories. In addition, even the youngest 
subjects comprehended and recalled story details and specifics about 
consequences with remarkable accuracy. 
Additional research should be conducted to see if the 
develoi:xnental trend can be documented among younger and older 
subjects. Sane revisions would have to be made for the Rejection 
Scale to be used with elementary school age children, especially in 
terms of the reading level of the instrument and the complexity of 
sane stories. In addition, it is unclear how large a role age plays 
in more advanced levels of moral development. Once subjects have 
reached eleventh grade, for example, they should have the cognitive 
capacity to function on the highest level of moral develoi:xnent. 
Thus, if the upper end of the develoi:xnental continuum is to be 
documented with the Rejection Scale other factors bes.ides age shoud 
be considered. Sane studies, for example, have used graduate 
philosophy students to document the upper end of the scale. 
An interesting area of research, then, would be the develoi:xnent 
of a Rejection Scale that could be used with all age groups. 
Currently, Piaget's measure of moral reasoning is most appropriate 
for ages 4 to 11, Kohlberg•s instrument is appropriate for ages 12 to 
adult, as is Rest's instrument. 
In conclusion, the psychometric properties of this new Rejection 
Scale need to be established with different populations to include 
the ful 1 range of demographic characteristics. In addition, a 
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thorough study of construct validity is needed. Finally, situational 
variables in addition to story consequences should be operationalized 
and controlled. The evidence from the present study suggests that 
this additional situational control could improve the reliability of 
the measure. In general, though, the data generated by this pilot 
study indicate a trend which suggests that the instrument is 
psychcmetrically sound. Hopefully this will encourage others to 
explore this area in more detail according to some of the suggestions 
I have detailed above. 
Main Study 
Situational Effects 
A structural-functional approach was explored in this study by 
examining two situational factors across a four year developmental 
span. It was hypothesized that story themes and story consequences 
would interact with structural capacity to influence the moral 
reasoning of 7th, 9th, and 11th graders. The situational effects of 
story theme and story consequences will be reviewed in this section. 
Surrmary of results. The consequence effect was significant in 
all forms of analysis. For example, the Scalogram Analysis 
demonstrated that the moral dilemmas could be arranged in the form of 
a cumulative or Guttman Scale based on the severity of consequences. 
This occurred for each age group and across the entire sample. The 
ANOVA demonstrated that there was a significant consequence effect at 
each age, with the strongest effects occurring for the 9th and 11th 
graders. 
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The results also show a strong dilemma effect. According to the 
Scalogram Analysis the average stage ratings show that the different 
dilemmas evoke different levels of reasoning. This relationship 
holds for each age group and across ages. The dilemma effect is also 
supported by Analysis of Variance as there were several significant 
differences between dilemmas at the mild and moderate consequence 
conditions. In addition, each dilemma shows a strong consequence 
effect. 
Implications and limitations . The scalability of dilemmas by 
consequence conditions, along with the significant differences 
between consequence conditions shown by the ANOVA, suggests that 
moral dilemmas can be arranged in a cumu1 ati ve order of difficulty 
based on consequences. Difficulty is defined in terms of level of 
reasoning. Situations which are most difficult are those which 
stimulate the lowest ' level of reasoning. Also, both forms of 
analysis al so show that there are meaningful differences among 
dilemmas in addition to consequence differences. Subjects rated all 
the dilemmas on a scale of one (mild consequences) to ten (severe 
consequences) in terms of severity of consequences (see Table 16, 
page 88). These results showed that the rank order ing of dilemmas by 
severity of consequences did not always match the rank ordering of 
dilemmas by rejection $Core (see Figures 10 and 11). Thus, the 
difficulty of dilemmas is due to more than just perceived story 
consequences. 
Perhaps story themes should be operationalized and controlled, as 
consequences were in this study, to more systematically examine their 
effects. One relevant dimension upon which story themes could be 
ordered is the protagonist-antagonist relationship. Subjects who 
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were interviewed in this study made distinctions between dilemmas 
based on the nature of this relationship, as it involved personal 
relationships in sane cases (e.g., Heinz, Doctor), 
social/conventional relationships in other instances (Webster) and 
one dilerrma involved a relationship with the world or human race in 
general (Draft). This relationship dimension fits well within 
Piaget's cognitive theory and Kohlberg's theory of moral 
development. According to Piaget (Flavell, 1963) we would expect 
devel oµnent to proceed fran a focus on personal , immediate, concrete 
experiences to a rule orientation that overrides the immediate and 
concrete, to an abstract level of functioning based on principles 
that are not necessarily defined by rules or convention. Kohlberg 
suggests a similar scheme of develoµnent with respect to the moral 
sphere. 
Thus, based on the information from the structured interviews, 
and the models of cognitive and moral develoµnent proposed by Pi a get 
and Kohlberg, I suggest that moral themes can be ordered along a 
dimension of story character relationship. This issue should be 
addressed empirically along with the exploration of other dimensions 
along which story themes could be ordered. 
The story consequences and other features of the moral dilemmas 
are relevant situational factors that contribute to the difficulty of 
these moral dilerrmas. As dilemmas vary in their level of difficulty 
we must expect variation within individuals in terms of the type of 
reasoning used across the different stories. 
Bern and Allen (1974) suggest that in our search for cross 
situational consistencies in behavior we must consider the relative 
difficulty of various situations. Thus, we cannot expect to find 
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consistency based solely on our knowledge of person variables such as 
developmental level. Consider the example of children learning 
math. Sane math pro bl ems are passed and others f ai 1 ed de pending on 
the interaction of difficulty and the child's level of development. 
Bern and Allen report that as long as the pattern of passes and 
failures matches our preconceived notion of difficulty then we can 
regard behavior as consistent even though not all items are passed or 
all items failed. For example, when a young child passes an addition 
problem yet fails a calculus problen he/she is regarded as 
consistent. This same analysis can be applied to the area of moral 
reasoning. Just as there are features of math problems which make 
them more or less difficult there are also features of moral problems 
(such as story consequences) that allow these dilemmas to be scaled 
along a dimension of difficulty. Thus we should expect subjects to 
pass certain moral situations (reject level 1 reasoning) and not 
others because of difficulty (situational or functional influence) 
and devel oµnental 1 evel (structural influence). Variability in 
reasoning, then, should not be associated with inconsistency. In 
fact, cross-situational variability may well be the mark of a highly 
refined discriminative facility - the ability to respond appropriately 
to subtle changes in situational contingencies. 
Individuals, then, are not entirely predictable based on a trait 
or structure of moral reasoning and they are not predictable by the 
situational contingencies alone. Perhaps the greatest degree of 
predi eta bi 1 ity canes ~f ran knowledge about the person and the 
situation and how these two variables interact. 
The trait approach, espoused by rigid structuralists such as 
Kohlberg, leaves us short of a complete understanding. Individuals 
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will appear to be inconsistent in their reasoning across situations 
if we attend only to their structural capacity. The situational 
approach, espoused by the pure functonalists, also leaves us short of 
a thorough understanding as the same situations bring about very 
different response patterns in individuals who are hypothesized to 
have structural differences. An integrated approach yields the 
greatest level of understanding as i ndi vi duals with more advanced 
structural capacity pass the more functionally difficult moral 
items. We must identify the relevant features of moral situations 
that make them more or less difficult to better understand how the 
functional interacts with the structural to generate moral responses. 
Bowers (1973) reports that both the trait and situation approach 
explain little of the change in experimental studies canpared to the 
interaction approach: 
An interactionist or biocognitive view denies the 
primacy of either traits or situations in the 
determination of behavior; instead it fully recognizes 
that whatever main effects do emerge will depend 
entirely upon the particular sample of settings and 
individuals under consideration .•. interactionism 
argues that situations are as much a function of the 
person as the person's behavior is a function of the 
situation (p. 327). 
Bowers (1973) claims that individuals or behaviors differ in their 
vulnerability to situational influence. The age and consequence 
interaction reported in the results demonstrates this clearly. Under 
mild consequences definite age trends appear as the structural 
capacity of the older subjects leads to higher levels of moral 
reasoning. Under moderate consequence conditions there are no longer 
any significant differences between 7th and 9th graders, while 11th 
graders still show a higher level of reasoning. Finally, under the 
severe condition the age groups converge, reducing the significant 
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differences. Vulnerability to situational influence, then, is a 
function of structural capacity and the strength of the functional 
aspect. Again, knowledge of the situation or person variables alone 
have limited value in terms of predictability next to the intergrated 
structural-functional model. 
Consequences are clearly relevant functional aspects of moral 
situ ati ans, and dilemmas can be ordered in terms of difficulty to 
form a Guttman or cumulative scale based on these consequences. A 
look at story themes leads to similar conclusions. There are 
meaningful differences among the dilemmas in addition to the 
consequence effect. Future research should focus on discovering 
other relevant situational variables and documenting their 
interaction with person variables to further refine the 
structural-functional model. Based on the results of this study we 
can assume that greater understanding or predi ctabi 1 ity wi 11 be 
achieved in this area as more relevant situational variables are 
documented and a system of assessment is designed to acccxnmodate 
this. Perhaps this level of understanding would help explain how 
human atrocities such as the Holocaust and the Mai Lai Massacre could 
occur in societies comprised of individuals capable of reasoning on 
the highest moral levels. 
Developmental Trend 
It was hypothesized that the Rejection Scale would have criterion 
group validity, thus it would be sensitive to the develoJ)11ental trend 
in moral reasoning between 7th and 11th grade. The develoJ)11ental 
trend in moral reasoning, as measured by the Rejection Scale, was 
documented across three age groups while situational variables were 
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controlled. This is the structural portion of the structural-
functional model. Regardless of situational influence, differences 
wi 11 ace ur across i ndi vi duals, hypo th es i zed to be due to the 
structura 1 or deve 1 opmenta 1 factor. 
Sumnary of Results. Scalogram Analysis showed that 7th graders 
had a 1 (Mer average stage rating than 9th graders and they were both 
lower than the 11th graders. This trend was matched without 
exception by all six moral dilemnas. 
The develoµnental trend was also documented with Analysis of 
Variance. There was a significant age effect at each consequence 
condition with the strongest effect occurring at the mild consequence 
condition. Moderate consequences distinguished 11th from 7th and 9th 
graders, as did the severe condition at a lower level of significance. 
Implications and limitations. Perhaps the most interesting age 
effect is the interaction with consequences. As Bowers (1973) 
suggests, behaviors or personality traits differ in their 
vulnerability to situational influence. This point is clearly 
illustrated in the age/consequence interaction. Figures 8 and 9 show 
that there are significant differences between all three age groups 
under the mild consequence condition. However, moderate consequences 
have a greater relative effect on 9th graders than they do with the 
7th and 11th graders. Thus the difference between 7th and 9th 
graders decreases under moderate consequences while the difference 
between 9th and 11th graders increases. Finally, the 11th graders 
are more affected by severe consequences than the other two age 
groups. Thus individuals differ in their vulnerability to 
situational influence, illustrating the unique structural-functional 
interaction. 
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While 11th graders may have the cognitive capacity to achieve the 
highest structural levels of reasoning, age does not guarantee 
development. A developmental trend was documented across 7th, 9th 
and 11th grade, however, these subjects occupied the middle stages of 
this new scale. It would be interesting to explore the 
person-situation interaction at both ends of the developmental 
scale. The current trend suggests that the more developmentally 
advanced individuals will manifest a smaller rate of vulnerability to 
situational influence. However, just as with the 11th graders in 
this study, potent situational influences could ~robably be created 
to influence the reasoning of individuals at the upper end of the 
scale. 
The application of this finding to "real world" problems is 
sanewhat unsettling. For example, we may select individuals of the 
highest moral character to govern our countries and participate in 
sophisticated scientific ventures such as space exploration, disease 
control, and nuclear weaponry. The potency of these situations, in 
tenns of influence on level of reasoning, is extremely high. 
Individuals with the most sophisticated reasoning capacity, then, may 
find themselves in situations that have an overwhelming influence on 
their level of reasoning. A decrement in reasoning level when 
dealing with issues such as the prospect of nuclear war can be 
devastating. 
Perhaps there are situations that are so potent that they cause 
even the most sophisticated reasoners to regress. Perhaps these are 
the very situations where the highest levels of reasoning are 
necessary to make critical decisions which affect the lives of 
thousands of people. The relationship of situational influence and 
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regression in reasoning is unsettling because regression is always in 
the direction of egocentricity or self interest, and most of the 
potent situations which would bring about regression involve 
decisions about the lives of many or the general welfare of the human 
species. 
Obviously we need to understand more about the effects of 
situational influence on higher level reasoning. The trend 
documented in this study is suggestive but it only deals with the 
middle range of reasoning. 
CHAPTER XII 
CON CL US IONS 
The purpose of this project was to integrate the structural and 
functional approach of moral reasoning. This was accomplished by 
measuring functional aspects such as story consequences and story 
themes at different structural-developmental levels (7th, 9th and 
11th graders). The result was a struct ura 1-f uncti onal model which 
showed unique effects of story theme, consequence, and age, along 
with s001e very meaningful interactions of these variables. For 
example, as consequences increased in severity, Rejection Scale 
scores decreased. This trend was consistent for each age group, 
however, the age groups differed in their vulnerability to this 
situational influence. Under ~ild consequence conditions the three 
age groups were significantly different. Moderate consequences 
affected the 9th graders more than the other two age groups and 
severe consequences had the greatest effect on 11th graders. 
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In general, this project generated support for both a structural 
and functional model. However, the greatest level of understanding 
is achieved from the integrated approach which considers unique 
structural-functional interactions. 
Further research is needed to identify additional functional 
aspects of moral situations which inpact on the reasoner, and 
document other unique structural-functonal interactions. The 
con cl usi ons from this study were based on 7th, 9th and 11th graders 
who occupied the middle of the developnental scale. Additional 
research is needed to build a structural-functional model that spans 
the full range of developnent. 
Finally, to facilitate the external validity of this new 
structural-functional model, several studies should be conducted with 
populations that vary in their demographic characteristics. In 
addition, the laboratory approach should be adapted for field study 
so that moral reasoning and behavior can be studied under more 
realistic conditions. At this point the results of this study are 
highly suggestive. Field studies are necessary to confirm these 
results. 
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Appendix A: 
OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people think about 
social problems. Different people often have different opinions about 
questions of right and wrong. There are no "right" answers in the way 
that there are right answers to math problems. We would like you to 
tell us what you think about several problem stories. The papers will 
be fed to a computer to find the average for the whole group, and no 
one will see your individual answers. 
Please give us the following information: 
Name 
-----------------------
Age 
School 
Class and period 
---- ------------
---------------
* * * * * 
female 
--
male 
--
* 
In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your op1n1ons about 
several stories. Here is a story as an example. Read it, then turn to 
the next page. 
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, 
has two small children and earns an average income. The car he buys 
will be his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work 
and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In 
trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that there were 
a lot of questions to consider. On the next page there is a list of 
some of these questions. 
If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these 
questions be in deciding what car to buy? 
PART A. (SAMPLE) 
On the left hand side of the page check one of the spaces by each 
question that could be considered. 
✓ 
-----
-✓--- · 
____ _L 
✓----
----✓ 
PART 8. (Sample) 
-block as where Frank lives. 
2. Would a used car be more economical in the 
long run than a ~ car. 
3. Whether the color was green, Frank's 
favorite color. 
4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at 
least 200. 
5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a 
compact car. 
6. Whether the front connibilies were 
differential. 
From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the 
whole group. Put the number of the most important question on the top 
line below. Do likewise for your 2nd, 3rd, and 4th most important 
choices. 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
5 
2 
3 
1 
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HEINZ AND THE DRUG 
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There 
was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of 
radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The 
drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what 
the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for 
a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to 
everyone he knew to _borrow the money, but he could only get together 
about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that 
his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay 
later. But the druggist said, . "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going 
to make money from it. 11 So Heinz got desperate and began to think about 
breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one) 
Should steal it 
Can't decide 
Should not steal it 
-----
HEINZ STORY 
On the left hand side of the page 
check one of the spaces by each 
question to indicate its importance. 
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1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld. 
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care 
so much for his wife that he'd steal? 
3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar 
or going to jail for the chance that stealing the 
drug might help? 
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has 
considerable influence with professional 
wrestlers. 
5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing 
this solely to help someone else. 
6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention 
have to be respected. 
7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing 
than the termination of dying, socially and 
individually. 
8. What values are going to be the basis for 
governing how people act towards each other. 
9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to 
hide behind a worthless law which only protects 
the rich anyhow. 
_____ 10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way 
of the most basic claim of any member of society. 
_____ 11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for 
being so greedy and cruel. 
_____ 12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more 
total good for the whole society or not. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
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STUDENT TAKE-OVER 
At Harvard University a group of students, called the, Students for a 
Democratic Society (SOS), believe that the University should not have an 
army ROTC program. SOS students are against the war in Viet Nam, and the 
army training program helps send men to fight in Viet Nam. The SOS 
students demanded that Harvard end the army ROTC training program as a 
university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get 
army training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for 
it towards their degrees. 
Agreeing with the SOS students, the Harvard professors voted to end 
the ROTC program as a university course. But the President of the 
University stated that he wanted to keep the army program on campus as a 
course. The SOS students felt that the President was not going to pay 
attention to the faculty vote or to their demands. 
So, one day 1 ast Apri 1 , two hundred· SOS students wa 1 ked into the 
university's administration building, and told everyone else to get out. 
They said they were doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army 
training program as a course. 
Should the students have taken over the administration building? (Check 
one) 
--
Yes, they should take it over 
Can't decide 
--
--
No, they should not take it over 
-----
-----
1. Are the students doing this to really help 
other people or are they doing it for kicks. 
2. Do the students have any right to take over 
property that doesn•t belong to them. 
3. Do the students realize that they might be 
arrested and fined, and even expelled from 
school. 
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4. Would taking over the building in the long run 
benefit more people to a greater extent. 
5. Whether the president stayed within the limits 
of his authority in ignoring the faculty vote. , 
6. Will the takeover anger the public and give 
all students a bad name. 
7. Is taking over a building consistent with 
principles of justice. 
8. Would allowing one student take-over encourage 
many other student take-overs. 
~- Did the president bring this misunderstanding 
on himself by being so unreasonable and 
uncooperative. 
10. Whether running the university ought to be in 
the hands of a few administrators or in the 
hands of all the people. 
11. Are the students following principles which 
they believe are above the law. 
12. Whether or not university decisions ought to 
be respected by students. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
ESCAPED PRISONER 
A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, 
however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, 
and took on the name of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and 
gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair 
to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his 
own profits to charity. Then one day Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, 
recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before, 
and whom the police had been looking for. 
Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent 
back to prison? (Check one) 
--
Should report him 
Can't decide 
--
--
Should not report him 
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-- . ---
ESCAPED PRISONER 
1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such 
a long time to prove he isn't a bad person? 
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2. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a 
crime, doesn't that just encourage more crime? 
3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and 
the oppression of our legal system? 
4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to 
society? 
5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson 
sould fairly expect? 
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from 
society, especially for a charitable man? 
7. How could anyone be so cruel and heart 1 ess as , 
to send Mr. Thompson to prison? 
8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had 
to serve out their full sentences if 
Mr. Thompson was let off? 
9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson? 
10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an 
escaped criminal, regardless of the 
circumstances? 
11. How would the will of the people and the 
public good best be served? 
12. Would going to prison do any good for 
Mr. Thompson or protect anybody? 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
NEWSPAPER 
Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed 
newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He 
wanted to speak out against the war in Viet Nam and to speak out against 
some of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long 
hair. 
When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for 
permission. The principal said it would be all right if before every 
publication Fred would turn in all his articles for the principal 1 s 
approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The 
principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper 
in the next two weeks. 
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But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would 
receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that 
they began to organize protests agains the hair regulation and other 
school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned 
the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should 
not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal 
ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave a reason that Fred's activities 
were disruptive to the operation of the school. 
Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one) 
Should stop it 
--
Can I t decide 
--
--
Should not stop it 
--- · --
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2. Did the principal give his word that the newspaper 
could be published for a long time, or did he just 
promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time? 
3. Would the students start protesting even more if the 
principal stopped the newspaper? 
4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, does 
the principal have the right to give orders to 
students? 
5. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to say 
11no11 in this case? 
6. If the principal stopped the newspaper would he be 
preventing full discussion of important problems? 
7. Whether the principal's order would make Fred lose 
faith in the principal? 
8. Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and 
patriotic to his country. 
9. What effect would stopping the paper have on the 
student's education in critical thinking and 
judgment? 
_____ 10. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of 
others in publishing his own opinions. 
_____ 11. Whether the principal should be influenced by some 
angry parents when it is the principal that knows 
best what is going on in the school. 
_____ 12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up 
hatred and discontent. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
WEBSTER 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted 
to hire another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to 
find. The only person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was 
Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself didn 1 t have 
anything against orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many 
of his customers didn 1 t like orientals. His customers might take their 
business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station. 
When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster 
said that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really 
had not hired anybody, because he could not find anybody who was a good 
mechanic besides Mr. Lee. 
What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one) 
Should have hired Mr. Lee 
--
Can I t decide 
--
Should not have hired him 
--
-----
WEBSTER 
2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial 
discrimination in hiring for jobs. 
3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against 
orientals himself or whether he means nothing 
personal in refusing the job. 
4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying 
attention to his customers' wishes would be best 
for his business. 
5. What individual differences ought to be relevant 
in deciding how society's roles are filled? 
6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic 
system ought to be completely abandoned. 
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7. Do a majority of people in Mr. Webster's society 
feel like his customers or are a majority against 
prejudice? 
8. Whether. hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use 
talents that would otherwise be lost to society. 
9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent 
with Mr. Webster's own moral beliefs? 
10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse 
the job, knowing how much it means to Mr. Lee? 
_____ 11. Whether the Christian commandment to love your 
fellow man applies to this case. 
_____ 12. If someone's in need, shouldn I t he be helped 
regardless of what you get back from him? 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important: 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA 
A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only 
about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak 
that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. 
She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, 
she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She 
said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few 
months anyway. 
What should the doctor do? (Check one) 
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__ He should give the lady an overdose 
that will make her die 
Can't decide 
--
__ Should not give her an overdose 
DOCTOR 
1. Whether the woman's family is in favor of 
giving her the overdose or not. 
2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as 
everybody else if giving an overdose would be 
the same as killing her. 
3. Whether people would be much better off 
without society regimenting their lives and 
even their deaths. 
4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like 
an accident. 
5. Does the state have the right to force 
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continued existence on those who don't want to 
live. 
6. What is the value of death prior to society's 
perspective on personal values. 
7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman's 
suffering or cares more about what society 
might think. 
8. Is helping to end another's life ever a 
responsible act of cooperation. 
9. Whether only God should decide when a person's 
life should end. 
10. What values the doctor has set for himself in 
his own personal code of behavior. 
11. Can society afford to let anybody end their 
lives when they want to. 
12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing 
and still protect the lives of individuals who 
want to live. 
From the list of questions above, select the four most important. 
Most important 
Second most important 
Third most important 
Fourth most important 
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APPENDIX B 
OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS 
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people think about 
social problems. Different people often have different opinions 
about questions of right and wrong. There are no 11right 11 answers in the 
way that there are right answers to math problems. We would like you to 
tell us what you think about several problem stories. This project is not 
part of the school program and no one in school will see any of these 
completed papers. Also, your work will be kept strictly confidential as 
your names will not appear in any report of this project. 
Please give us the following information: 
Name 
------------------------
female 
---
Age School 
----------------
male 
---
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In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your opinions about 
several stories. Here is a story as an example. 
Frank .Jones 
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has 
two small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be 
his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive 
around town, but sometimes for vacation also. He has the chance to buy a 
1970 station wagon from a friend. In trying to decide whether to buy this 
car, Frank Jones realized that there were many reasons for making important 
decisions like this. 
When deciding about what Frank Jones should do, consider the reasons 
listed below. First choose yes or no about whether Mr. Jones should buy 
the car, then answer the questions under the choice you made. Answer these 
questions by circling G for a good answer ( it is a good reason for making 
the decision in this case); P for a poor answer (it is not a good reason 
for making the decision in this case); or U for uncertain (you are not sure 
if it is a good reason for making the decision in this case). 
Shaul d Frank Jones buy this car? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
/ G--· ·, u p A large room car is G u p This car may use 
"-.:,_I better than a com- too much gas. 
pact car. 
/: ~ 
The color of the car G u { p ) G u p People should not 
·..___,,-
is the same as the buy cars from 
color of Frank's friends. 
house. 
(0 u p The price of the car G u p The price of the 
is low. car is too high. 
Note: The person in the sample decided that Frank should buy the car, so 
only the answers under the YES choice were circled and none of the 
NO responses were circled. 
Now read through the next stories and answer yes or no about what the 
person should do. Then circle G (good reason), U (uncertain about this rea-
son), or P (poor reason) next to each reason. You must answer yes or no for 
each story. Both choices may seem reasonable but choose just one anyway. 
Each main story will be repeated three times with a different ending 
each time. Read the main story and all three different endings first, then 
go back and answer the questions under each ending. Once you have done this 
for one main story, move on to the next main story and answer it in the same 
manner (read all three endings first). 
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THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA 
A lady in China was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she 
had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was 
so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die 
sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm 
periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. 
She said that she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in 
a few months anyway. 
Ending 1 
The penalty in China, for doctors who kill out of mercy, is that they 
must give at least half of their salary to charity every year for the rest 
of their life. The doctor was not sure if anyone would realize that the 
death was caused by him. 
Should the doctor give the lady the overdose that will cause her death? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u p It wi 11 rel i eve the G u p The doctor would 
doctor of some get into too 
responsibility. much trouble. 
G u p If, and only if, G u p If, and only if, 
there is a law it is against 
allowing the doctor the law. 
to give the overdose. 
G u p The l ady, as an G u p No individual has 
individual, has the the right to 
right to choose to interfere with 
die. life's course. 
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Ending 2 
There is no penalty in China, for doctors who end life out of mercy, if 
the judge decides the doctor made the best decision. If the judge decides 
that the doctor did not make the right decision the doctor must give free 
medical treatment to the family of the victim. 
Should the doctor give the lady the overdose that will cause her death? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u p It wi 11 re 1 i eve the G u p The doctor would 
doctor of some get into too 
responsibility. much trouble. 
G u p If, and only if, G u p If, and only if, 
there is a 1 aw it is against 
allowing the doctor the law. 
to give the overdose. 
u p The 1 ady, as an G u p No individual has 
individual, has the the right to 
right to choose to interfere with 
die. life 1 s course. 
Ending 3 
The penalty in China for killing someone, by accident or on purpose, is 
the death penalty. The doctor knew that the people in charge of the 
hospital were watching him closely to see what he was going to do. 
Should the doctor give the lady the overdose that will cause her death? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
P It will relieve the G 
doctor of some 
res pons i bi 1 ity. 
P If, and only if, G 
there is a 1 aw 
allowing the doctor 
to give the overdose. 
P The 1 ady, as an 
individual, has the 
right to choose to 
die. 
G 
u 
u 
u 
P The doctor would 
get into too 
much trouble. 
P If, and only if, 
it is against 
the 1 aw. 
P No individual has 
the right to 
interfere with 
1 ife 1 s course. 
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GAIL 
Ann took the school lunch money which had been collected from all the 
students for a full week. When she saw Gail, her best friend, she told her 
that she had something very serious and personal that she wanted to talk 
about. But, before she told Gail anything about the incident, she asked 
for her promise not to tell anyone what she said. Gail agreed to keep 
everything she heard a secret. When Ann told Gail she took the money, Gail 
was in a difficult position. 
Ending 1 
She had given her word not to tell anyone but she knew that until the 
thief was caught there would be no passes or special privileges for any 
students, and the whole class would have to stay after school every day 
until the truth was discovered. As long as Gail stayed after school she 
would be unable to try out for the tennis team, even though she was 
supposed to be the captain this year. 
Should Gail te 11 the teacher that Ann took the money? 
' 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u p Because it creates G u p Because Ann might 
too much trouble if take revenge and 
she does not turn hurt Gail. 
her in. 
G u p Because Ann broke a G u p Because it could 
school rule and ruin her friend-
should be reported. ship with Ann. 
G u p Because Ann's behav- G u p Because trust 
ior goes against between friends 
principles of right is the most 
and wrong. Even if important princi-
it were not against . pl e. 
the rules, it should 
be reported. 
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Ending 2 
She had given her word not to tell anyone but she knew that until the 
thief was caught there would be no passes or special privileges for any 
students. Also, students would have to use a different procedure for 
buying lunches, which would create an extra hassle for them. 
Shaul d Gail tell the teacher that Ann took the money? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u p Because it creates G u p Because Ann might 
too much trouble if take revenge and 
she does not turn hurt Gail. 
her in. 
G u p Because Ann broke a G u p Because it could 
school rule and ruin her friend-
should be reported. ship with Ann. 
G u p Because Ann's behav- G u p Because trust 
ior goes against between friends 
principles of right is the most 
and wrong. Even if important princi-
it were not against ple. 
the rules, it should ... 
be reported. 
Ending 3 
She had given her word not to tell anyone but she knew that until the 
thief was caught students would have to use a different procedure for 
buying lunches, which would create an extra hassle for them. 
Should Gail tell the teacher that Ann took the money? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u p Because it creates G u _p Because Ann might 
too much trouble if take revenge and 
she does not turn hurt Gail. 
her in. 
G u p Because Ann broke a G u p Because it could 
school rule and ruin her friend-
should be reported. ship with Ann. 
G u p Because Ann's behav- G u p Because trust 
ior goes against between friends 
principles of right is the most 
and wrong. Even if important princi-
it were not against ple. 
the rules, it should 
be reported. 
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HEINZ 
In Europe a woman was suffering unbearable pain from a kidney 
infection. There was one drug that the doctors thought might cure this 
illness. It was a rare form of penicillin that a druggist in the same 
town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the 
druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid 
$200 for the penicillin and was charging $2000 for a small dose of the 
drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow 
the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of 
what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was extremely ill and in 
severe pain, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But 
the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money 
from it. 11 So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into 
the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. 
Ending 1 
Since the store is well guarded, it is likely that Heinz would be 
caught and arrested. The penalty for theft over $1,000 in this country is 
life in prison with hard labor. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? 
YES 
Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good 
G u 
G u 
G u 
P Heinz might be mis-
erable throughout 
his life if his wife 
stays sick. 
P Heinz has a respon-
s i b il i ty to take 
care of his wife. 
G 
G 
P Saving a life is more G 
important than the 
druggist's legal 
right of property. 
Uncer-
tai n 
u 
u 
u 
NO 
Poor 
p Heinz would get 
in too much 
trouble. 
P It is wrong even 
if he does not get 
caught because 
stealing is 
against the 1 aw. 
P The druggist's 
right to property 
should be 
respected. 
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Ending 2 
The store had a burglar alarm but since it was located in a secluded 
section of town Heinz could probably take the drug without getting caught. 
The penalty for theft in this country involves returning the stolen item 
and one week of hard work for the victim. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tai n Poor 
G u p Heinz might be mis- G u p Heinz would get 
erable throughout in too much 
his life if his wife trouble. 
stays sick. 
G u p Heinz has a respon- G u p It is wrong even 
sibility to take if he does not get 
care of his wife. caught because 
stealing is 
against the law. 
G u p Saving a life is more G u p The druggist's 
important than the right to property 
druggist's legal should be 
right of property. respected. 
Ending 3 
The store is part of the security rounds of the local eolice so Heinz 
will probably get caught soon after he delivers the drug to his wife. The 
penalty for theft in this country is a two ~ear j ai 1 sentence. 
Should Heinz steal the drug? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u p Heinz might be mis- G u p Heinz would get 
erable throughout in too much 
his life if his wife trouble. 
stays sick. 
G u p Heinz has a respon- G u p It is wrong even 
sibility to take if he does not get 
care of his wife. caught because 
stealing is 
against the law. 
G u p Saving a life is more G u p The druggist's 
important than the right to property 
druggist's legal should be 
right of property. respected. 
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JOE 
Joe is a fourteen year old boy who wanted to buy a radio for his room. 
His father promised him he could buy the radio if he saved the money for it 
himself. So Joe did some extra chores around the house and odd jobs for 
neighbors. So, he saved the $50.00 he needed for the radio and a little 
more besides. But just before he purchased the radio his father changed 
his mind and wanted to spend Joe's money on a fishing trup with his 
friends. So he asked Joe to give him the money he had saved. 
Ending 1 
While Joe knew that he would not get in any trouble for refusing to 
give the money to his father, he realized that his father might get a 
1 i t t 1 e angry . 
Should Joe give his father the money? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
P Because otherwise he G 
will get in too much 
trouble. 
P A good son should G 
do what his fat her 
wants. 
P Joe should trust G 
that his fat her 
wo u 1 d be do i n g 
what is best for 
everyone. 
u 
u 
u 
P Because he wants 
the radio. 
P Because promises 
are a 1 ways sup-
posed to be kept. 
P Joe has the right 
to keep the money 
he earned regard-
less of his duty 
as a son. 
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Ending 2 
He explained that if Joe did not give him the money he would lose his 
bicycle and not be allowed to spend his summer vacation at camp. Riding 
the bicycle ,s Joe's favorite activity and he looks forward to summer camp 
all year. 
Should Joe give his father the money? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
Ending 3 
P Because otherwise he G 
will get in too much 
trouble. 
P A good son should G 
do what his fat her 
wants. 
P Joe should trust G 
that his fat her 
would be doing 
what is best for 
everyone. 
u 
u 
u 
P Because he wants 
the radio. 
P Because promises 
are always sup-
posed to be kept. 
P Joe has the right 
to keep the money 
he earned regard-
less of his duty 
as a son. 
He explained that if Joe did not give him the money he would not be 
allowed to watch television or see his friends that week. 
Should Joe give his father the money? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
P Because otherwise he G 
will get in too much 
trouble. 
P A good son should G 
do what his fat her 
wants. 
P Joe should trust G 
that his father 
wo u l d be do i n g 
what is best for 
everyone. 
u 
u 
u 
P Because he wants 
the radio. 
P Because promises 
are always sup-
posed to be kept. 
P Joe has the right 
to keep the money 
he earned regard-
less of his duty 
as a son. 
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WEBSTER 
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to 
hire another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. 
The only person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but 
he was Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself didn't have anything against 
Orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee. 
Ending 1 
Most of his customers not only promised to take their business 
elsewhere, but also threatened to destroy Mr. Webster's property. 
Should Mr. Webster hire Mr. Lee? 
YES 
Uncer-
Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
P A good mechanic 
could help busi-
ness. 
P Because racial 
discrimination is 
against the law. 
P Hiring should be 
based on ability 
not ethnic back-
ground. 
NO 
Uncer-
Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
P It might hurt Mr. 
Webster's business 
too much. 
P If most other people 
in the community 
would agree with 
not hiring Mr. Lee. 
P Fair hiring procedures 
will not do anyone any 
good if the business 
fails. 
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Ending 2 
Some of his customers didn't like Orientals and would probably take 
their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station. 
Should Mr. Webster hire Mr. Lee? 
YES 
Uncer-
Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
Ending 3 
P A good mechanic 
could help busi-
ness. 
P Because racial 
discrimination is 
against the law. 
P Hiring should be 
based on ability 
not ethnic back-
ground. 
NO 
Uncer-
Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
P It might hurt Mr. 
Webster's business 
too much. 
P If most other people 
in the community 
would agree with 
not hiring Mr. Lee. 
P Fair hiring procedures 
wi 11 not do anyone any 
good if the business 
fails. 
Some of his customers didn't like Orientals and they might get angry. 
Should Mr. Webs-tier hire Mr. Lee? 
YES 
Uncer-
Good tain Poor 
G 
G 
G 
u 
u 
u 
P A good mechanic 
could help busi-
ness. 
P Because racial 
discrimination is 
against the law. 
P Hiring should be 
based on ability 
not ethnic back-
ground. 
NO 
Uncer-
Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
P It might hurt Mr. 
Webster's business 
too much. 
P If most other people 
in the community 
would agree with 
not hiring Mr. Lee. 
P Fair hiring procedures 
wi 11 not do anyone any 
good if the business 
fails. 
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DRAFT DEC IS ION 
Bill has reached the age for draft registration for the armed forces. 
He is wondering whether he should register or not. Where Bill lives people 
who have not registered for the draft have been 
Ending 1 
asked to do two years of community service, such as working in a 
hospital. 
Should Bill register for the draft? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tai n Poor 
G u p Because otherwise G u p Because Bill could 
Bi 11 may get in get hurt in a war. 
too much trouble. 
G u p Because it is a G u p If a majority of 
citizen's duty and Bill's family and 
a national law. friends are against 
the draft. 
G u p The leaders of the G u p Individuals should 
country are better have the right to 
able than any in- decide whether or not 
dividual to make to risk their lives. 
decisions concern-
ing the well-being 
of the entire 
nation. 
Ending 2 
sentenced to jail for ten years with no chance for parole. 
Should Bill register for the draft? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
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Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
Ending 3 
P Because otherwise G 
Bill may get in 
too much trouble. 
P Because it is a G 
citizen's duty and 
a national law. 
P The leaders of the G 
country are better 
able than any in-
di vi dual to make 
decisions concern-
ing the well-being 
of the entire 
nation. 
u 
u 
u 
P Because Bill could 
get hurt in a war. 
P If a majority of 
Bill's family and 
friends are against 
the draft. 
P Individuals should 
have the right to 
decide whether or not 
to risk their lives. 
required to donate one half of their salary to the government for ten 
years. 
Should Bill register for the draft? 
YES NO 
Uncer- Uncer-
Good tain Poor Good tain Poor 
G u 
G u 
G u 
P Because otherwise G 
Bill may get in 
too much trouble. 
P Because it is a G 
citizen's duty and 
a national law. 
P The leaders of the G 
country are better 
able than any in-
dividual to make 
decisions concern-
ing the well-being 
of the entire 
nation. 
u 
u 
u 
P Because Bill could 
get hurt in a war. 
P If a majority of 
Bill's family and 
friends are against 
the draft. 
P Individuals should 
have the right to 
decide whether or not 
· to risk their lives. 
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